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Reflections on Chinese Political Economy 
 
By Kalim SIDDIQUI1† 
  
Abstract. The aim of this paper is to discuss the reasons for the rapid growth in the Chinese 
economy over the last three decades. China has been growing fastest in human history, 
which has an impact on the global economy and also various challenges that the country 
faces. It is seen as heralding a major shift in the international division of labour through 
changes in its output and employment pattern. China is described as becoming the “work-
shop” of the world as a result of the expansion of its manufacturing production. Its impact 
on other Asian economies and also on the world economy has the potential to be enormous. 
Market reforms and opening up of the Chinese economy to trade and foreign capital since 
the early 1980s, have unleashed entrepreneurial energies. China’s development policies can 
be best understood if these are looked at from an institutional economic perspective. This 
article is based on a review of published papers in the field of economic policies, focusing 
on the debate concerning the respective roles of the state and the market. A wide range of 
data sources are presented, including statistics compiled and generated by wide range of 
organisations such as IMF, World Bank and WTO that are non-governmental agencies. 
Secondary data of this type provides greater potential for addressing the research questions 
than statistics produced by the national government. This study finds that corporate debt 
has risen in recent years in China, a large part of these loans having been financed with 
investment in trust products issued by the banks. In addition, a huge amount of credit has 
been channelled into the real estate sector, and seems to be heading towards the housing 
and estate sectors, meaning that most of this is speculative. Investments are financed by 
credit; which clearly needs to be repaid. If these levels of debt become unsustainable this 
could pose a major challenge for the Chinese economy. 
Keywords. Chinese economic reforms, state intervention, economic performance and trade. 
JEL. F11, F40, N10. 
 
1. Introduction 
his paper examines the growth trajectory of China and the structural change 
which it has undergone in the last thirty years. The country is gradually 
transforming its economy from low value-added industries towards high 
value-added industries. It appears that during this period China did not follow the 
policies prescribed by the IMF and World Bank but undertook selective 
government intervention to facilitate domestic businesses (Rasiah et al. 2013; 
Breslin, 2010).  
This article argues that China’s development policies can be fully understood if 
we take an institutional economic perspective. This means that more attention is 
needed to look at the economic, political, historical, institutional, and cultural 
context in which the economic development has taken place. The aim is to explain 
why and how the Chinese economy has grown so dramatically. China has been 
growing faster than any previous economy in human history which has had an 
impact on the scale of the environmental challenges that it faces. Increased water 
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shortages, depletion of natural resources, ecological crises and widening inequality 
appear to be the biggest challenges the country is facing.  
The intention here is not to focus on issues such as inequality and the 
environmental challenges China is facing, but to briefly summarise the current 
position. Inequality in China has grown rapidly since the 1980s and currently it 
resembles the US, one of the most unequal societies in the world. It is still 
considerably less unequal than Latin America, but China started this transformation 
just three decades ago from a very egalitarian society (Nolan, 1991). Within a very 
short period all this has changed, and due to a 9-10% growth rate, aspirations are 
high. However, if growth rates start to slow down, then industrial strikes, 
demonstrations, protests and popular discontent may increase. This could lead to 
political instability, which in turn would discourage investment, growth and 
economic development. Rapid income growth and increased levels of consumption 
has placed further pressure on the country’s natural resources such as land, forests, 
water and air. In relative terms, China has been poorly endowed with natural 
resources. For instance, it has only 8% of the world’s cultivated land, while it has 
22% of the world’s population to feed. Within the last three decades, a large 
amount of forests have been cleared to make way for towns and industries. China 
faces unprecedented challenges with soil erosion and rapid urbanisation. Since 
1980, nearly one-half of its forests have been destroyed. Currently, about 40% of 
China’s land is affected by soil erosion, salinization and desertification (Yongding, 
2012; Vincelette et al, 2011). 
The methodology of this study is derived from the aims of the study and for this 
purpose secondary data is seen to be useful to find information and to explain our 
research problem. The research question requires international comparison 
statistics and provides the main source to answer the research questions and 
address the objectives of this paper. Analysing secondary data which has already 
been collated is the only possible way to get meaningful macroeconomic data. The 
secondary data sets together provide quantifiable information and statistics 
published regularly by the governments and various international organisations. 
Secondary sources facilitate research making it is easier to compare data from two 
or more countries. A number of international surveys conducted, for example, by 
the World Bank, IMF and OECD, provide comparable cross-country data that can 
be used for our purposes. Our research questions can be answered by the 
information from this secondary data and published research papers in this subject 
area.  
Nearly two-third of China’s population still lives in the countryside and there 
are still more than 150 million surplus agricultural labourers. Rural distribution of 
income is more unequal than in the recent past: the Gini coefficient of rural 
distribution of income rose from 0.21 in 1980 to 0.40 in 2000. There has been a 
massive decline in the number of people living below the poverty line during the 
last three decades. The existence of rural poverty provides an incentive to migrate 
to urban areas, especially for a largely unskilled or semi-skilled workforce. A large 
literature exists on Chinese poverty measurement. For example, according to a 
World Bank estimate, the proportion of people living below the poverty line in 
China fell from 73.5% (i.e. 730 million people) in 1980 to 8.1% (106 million) in 
2005. The calculation was based on US$1 per capita per day at 2005 PPP. 
However, since the World Bank has now revised this calculation to US$ 1.25 per 
capita per day, such an estimate increases the figure to 16% for those living below 
the poverty line in China in 2005 (World Bank, 2011a). 
Moreover, China has diverse regional economies that range from extreme 
poverty to relative prosperity. In the early 1990s, Guangdong became a centre for 
manufacturing industries and its wealth soon began to spread to the other coastal 
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towns. In 2003 China became the largest recipient of foreign capital, overtaking the 
US. This inward investment mainly went to subsidiaries of foreign multinational 
companies which are largely behind the upsurge in growth of exports, being 
responsible for up to 60% of all Chinese exports. China’s contemporary political 
economy is a very exciting area of study. The Chinese economy has grown at an 
average annual rate of 9% for more than three decades. As a result, China is seen as 
heralding a major shift in the international division of labour through changes in 
output and employment patterns. It has been described as the “work-shop” of the 
world through the expansion of manufacturing production (McKay & Song, 2010). 
These higher growth rates in the Chinese economy have led to changes in all 
sectors of the economy. As a result, per capita income and domestic demand has 
risen dramatically in recent decades. This begs the question: Which factors have 
contributed to this ‘miracle’ growth for over three decades. 
Studying Chinese growth is important because potentially its impact on other 
Asian economies and also on the world economy may be enormous. China’s rapid 
development within a short period of time represents one of the most striking 
phenomena in the global economy, which has not been experienced before. To 
explain this is not an easy task. Several decades of government economic control 
and regulations stifled entrepreneurship, private enterprise and brought about an 
economic standstill. Market reforms, opening up markets to trade and foreign 
capital, have helped to unleash Chinese entrepreneurial energies since the early 
1980s. These reforms took place at a time when the global economy was going 
through huge changes which proved to be beneficial to China. 
In the pre-market reform period, China had already invested in critical areas 
such as education and health care for the majority of its people. The government 
undertook the policy of egalitarian land distribution and mobilised the female 
population to participate in education and job markets. It carried out a 
comprehensive radical land reform, altering rural asset distribution in the country. 
It eliminated the centuries’-old domination of landlordism and brought greater 
equality of access to land in the countryside. Along with this, investment in key 
areas like rural electrification facilitated the growth of rural industries. The 
government also built an impressive rural health system prior to market reforms. 
As a result, life expectancy of its people was increased and the infant mortality 
ratefell to 31 per 1,000 live births. About 85% of its villages had a cooperative 
medical system. According to Sen, “The sharp expansion of life expectancy took 
place in China well before its recent agricultural reforms, which have led, for the 
first time, to very substantial increase in food availability per head. In fact, much of 
the expansion of Chinese life expectancy has taken place with very moderate 
increases in per capita food output and availability, and much of the enhancement 
seems to have been brought about by skilful public intervention in the delivery of 
health care, medical attention and food” (Sen, 1987:26). 
There is a substantial body of literature concerning this transition from state 
control to pro-market reforms. Economic reform in China began back in 1978 with 
the replacement of the commune system of agriculture by the household 
responsibility system. Under the new system, a household was granted land 
cultivation rights i.e. each household got a more or less equal size plot of land, 
subject to differences in family size. This led to a rapid increase in agricultural 
output, raising rural income and helped poor households to break out of poverty. In 
fact, this is a form of contract system with households subject to taxes and 
procurement prices on their land use. Besides raising procurement prices, the 
farmers were also allowed to retain and sell much of the surplus of their produce, 
after having fulfilled the required quota. As a result, agricultural output rose at an 
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annual rate of 7% between 1979 and 1984, compared to 2.7% in the previous 
decade (Bardhan, 2010). 
In 1978, the township and village enterprises (TVEs) were given responsibility 
for resource allocation, which created very successful and dynamic sectors of the 
economy in the 1980s and 1990s. It became a stimulating force to attract private 
investment into the rural sector. TVEs started producing wide varieties of goods, 
ranging from consumer goods to capital goods. Regional governments provided 
freedom and incentives to help these businesses. Entrepreneurship was encouraged. 
Economic reforms in agriculture, special economic zones, TVEs, management 
contracts in state owned enterprises (SOEs) and privatisation were initially tried in 
a few regions and then spread further. Farmers’ savings increased, which led in 
turn to greater investment in agriculture and along with the spread of primary 
education and dissemination of knowledge, this helped farmers to invest in more 
profitable commercial crops (Bardhan, 2010). 
After two decades of economic reforms, TVEs, largely under local government 
control played a leading role in the rapid expansion of labour-intensive rural 
industries. The contribution of rural industries to GDP rose sharply from just 6% in 
1978 to 26% in 1996. China benefitted from the plentiful availability of rural 
labour force, cheap credit from rural cooperatives, and the high savings of the 
farmers. Instead of the previous “grain first” policy, farmers were encouraged to 
diversify production to more high-value commodities. At the same time, crop 
prices rose by 30% over the five year period. In addition, supplies of agricultural 
inputs were increased and also provided at subsidised rates. 
This paper is organised as follows. The remainder of this introductory section 
briefly outlines the importance of the Chinese economy. This is followed by an 
overview of Chinese economic history. The focus then shifts to government 
developmental policy, particularly after the adoption of pro-market reforms. 
Economic growth, investments and savings issues are then examined. Analysis 
then centres on issues of exchange rate, followed by comparative advantage and 
trade issues. The Chinese economy is then considered from a global perspective 
before the closing remarks summarise the key findings of this research. 
Higher economic growth in the 1980s led to a sharp decline in absolute poverty 
levels as a result of largely internal factors. These included institutional changes in 
the agricultural sector, which employed the largest proportion of the poorest 
workers, with global factors initially playing a negligible role. With respect to 
poverty alleviation in China, Bardhan (2008) argues that the rapid decrease in the 
number of people living below the poverty line was linked to domestic rather than 
external factors and is often mistakenly attributed by the mainstream economists to 
global competition. According to Bardhan these factors include earlier land 
reforms, and an increase in agricultural commodity prices and productivity 
(Bardhan, 2008). 
There has been intense debate about China’s high growth rates and poverty 
reduction since it adopted economic reforms in 1978. Growth was achieved due to 
high rates of capital accumulation. In terms of economic diversification and 
structural change, China has followed the classical industrialization pattern from 
agriculture to manufacturing activities in the last three decades. China’s 
manufacturing sector has doubled its share of the workforce and tripled its share of 
output (Jacques, 2009).China is trying to industrialise in 21st century and might be 
expected to experience difficulties as a late industrialising nation. Some academics 
argue that China’s industrialisation is characterised by an authoritarian political and 
economic order (Hutton, 2006; Myres, 1991). They see this face as ‘primitive 
capitalist accumulation’ as described by Marx’s Capital Volume 1. It may involve 
the huge task of maintaining political stability in the country (Nolan, 2005). While 
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others argue that China should follow US model of development rather than social 
democratic European model or state-led industrialisation of theJapanese model 
(Jefferson, 2008; Naughton, 2007). According to them, under current globalised 
conditions and high mobility of capital and products, the only option for China is 
that to organise its economy on the basis of ‘free-market’ policies (Tisdell, 2009; 
Sun 2007; Naughton, 2007).  
China did not begin its transformation by following the standard theory such as 
dismantling quantity restrictions on imports, reduction in import tariffs and 
currency convertibility, as prescribed by the international financial institutions 
(Bardhan, 2008; Dornbusch & Helmers, 1988).  China rather began by reforming 
its economy gradually using appropriate techniques for this approach such as state 
trading monopolies being replaced by non-tariff barriers and license restrictions. At 
the same time Special Economic Zones (SEZs) were set up to specialise in exports 
and attract foreign investors. As a result, a dramatic increase in output and 
investment took place in the 1980s and 1990s.By the 1990s China started exporting 
whole range of products and its portfolio resembled that of those countries with an 
income levelat least three times higher than China. It could be described as 
phenomenal development in the last nearly three decades. The FDI has risen 
sharply since 1980s.The availability of a pool of cheap skilled labour did help it to 
export at competitive prices. FDI played a key role in building its manufacturing 
sector and which became integrated backwards and the supply chain moved from 
developed countries to China. Chinese state provision of basic goods in terms of 
housing, food, and cheap transport facilities for urban registered inhabitants has 
played an important role in keeping wages low (Davies, 2012; Naughton, 2007).  
Exports and FDI did contribute to an increase in employment opportunities, 
technical upgrading and management efficiency. Contrary to what is widely 
believed, FDI, imported technology and skills were the principal source of 
economic growth, however, their net impact on GDP growth has been modest 
compared to that of domestic investment or consumption. Even when trade was 
booming between 2002 and 2008, the increase in net exports contributed only 15% 
of total GDP growth (Branstetter and Lardey, 2008; Naughton, 2007).However, 
with increased openness in East Asian countries imports rose faster than exports, 
along with the surge in capital inflows, which eventually led to East Asian crisis in 
1997 (Siddiqui, 2011). China was the only exception, where exports rose faster 
than imports. The success lies besides other things, in its ability to shield its 
economy from the global economy; this proved critical to its efforts to build rapid 
industrialization (Davies, 2012). 
 
2. Economic History 
For a comprehensive understanding of development in present-day China, it 
would be useful to look at its history. China has more than 4000 years of recorded 
history and is regarded as one of the cradles of human civilization. Its economy is 
known for prosperity in the remote past. However, itsmost recent history (of the 
last two centuries) it has been hampered by feudal crisis, civil wars and 
colonisationresulting in economic downturn, mass poverty, frequent occurrence of 
famines and misery. From the beginning of the 19th century to mid-20th century, the 
economy rapidly deteriorated and the country became one of the poorest countries 
in the world. Angus Maddison (2006) has calculated Chinese per capita income in 
constant 1990 US dollars, in PPP (Purchasing Power Parity) terms for different 
periods. According to his estimation in 1700 in PPP terms China’s share alone of 
the worlds’ income was 23.1%. It rose further to 32.4% in 1820. Thereafter, in 
1890 it rapidly declined to 13.2%, and further declined to only 5.2% in 
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1950.China’s per capita income declined from US$600 in 1820 to US$552 in 1913, 
declined further to US$439 in 1950.China began the 20th century at very low 
income levels. The country’s share of world income was much smaller than its 
share of the world’s population. For example, in 1913 China’s share of world GDP 
was 8.9%, while the share of population was 26.4% (Maddison, 2006). 
During the 18th century, the Chinese economy was far more advanced than that 
of Europe in both an economic and cultural sense, but a question arises as why 
China did not become birthplace of capitalism? Tawney argues that “China 
ploughed with iron when Europe used wood, and continued to plough with it when 
Europe used steel” (Tawney, 1966:11).China’s agrarian structure in the past was 
not dominated by a land aristocracy on the scale known in Medieval Europe. The 
landlords in imperial China were always subordinated to bureaucracy. The aim was 
that they must not become too powerful and were prevented from owning beyond a 
certain size of landholdings and thus to limit their economic and social power in 
the country side. Unlike in Europe, Chinese bureaucrats did not depend on 
landownership to acquire wealth, but rather relied upon their control of state 
apparatus (Tawney, 1966). 
During the Ming and Qing dynasties the pace of technological development was 
slower i.e. innovation in labour saving technologies, compared to what happened in 
Western Europe. In the 13thcentury unlike Europe, China had nolabour shortage but 
had a land shortage. Due to the land shortage, Chinese were driven to find a 
remarkable solutions such as raising land productivity through more intensive 
farming not by more capital input but by increasing the amount of labour input and 
by the introduction of improved seeds and promoting the use of multiple cropping 
and organic fertilizers (Huang, 1990; Perkins, 1969). For instance, Bray (1984) 
argues that, “Chinese crop characteristics, together with the Chinese farmer’s 
attention to economical sowing and careful tending of each plant, generally 
produced far higher rates of return than were normal in Europe before agricultural 
revolution” (Bray, 1984: 287).He further emphasises that the ratio of harvested to 
seed grain in China was average twenty or thirty to one, while in medieval Europe 
three or four to one (Bray, 1984:7). Therefore, this period was one of technological 
and economic slowdown but agricultural productivity kept on rising and also kept 
pace with rapid increases in the population.  
However, the state did not encourage the expansion of trade and commerce, as 
happened in Europe. Commercialisation did not lead to development of new 
thinking and policies. Any surplus from commerce and industry was invested in 
land rather than further expansion of industry. Unlike in Europe, the new emerging 
traders and industry owners did not challenge the existing political culture, in 
China, “the artisans and merchants of towns had no power and knew nothing of 
self-government; their social status was low and they had to rely on officials for 
protection” (Xu & Wu, 2000: 389).Another way capitalism could have been 
developed such as from within, neither witnessed revolution from above as 
happened with Meiji Restoration in Japan. China’s location and geographical 
isolation acted as protection from its western border by high Himalaya range of 
mountains, which reduced indirect contact with other civilisations. On the other 
hand, the eastern Chinese neighbours were much small nations, did not pose any 
threat or challenges. These conditions dampened external forces which may have 
driven China towards capitalism (Jacques, 2009). 
European visitors to China were impressed by the level of development in trade 
and commerce. In 1738 Du Halde argues, “The facilities of conveying merchandise 
by means of rivers and canals, have rendered the domestic trade of empire always 
very flourishing… The inland trade of China is so great that the commerce of all 
Europe is not to be compared therewith; the provinces being like so many 
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kingdoms, which communicate to each other their respective products” (cited in 
Nolan, 1991: 119).Trade and commerce were quite developed in China by the 17th 
and 18th centuries, especially in areas like the Yangtze Delta and the Pearl River 
Delta which witnessed huge expansion of textile production and exports, in turn 
leading to further commercialisation and urbanisation of the region. Due to this, in 
the 17thcentury, the region was already known as one of the largest centres of 
economic development and innovation (Nolan, 1991).Economic historians have 
pointed out that the Chinese economy made sustained development in the centuries 
prior to industrial revolution in Europe. In the past the Chinese state encouraged 
market forces to achieve certain goals. A remarkable increase in productivity and 
output in the agricultural sector prior to 17th and 18th century was an unparalleled 
experience. To meet the challenges of growing population, rice production was 
increased by raising productivity (particularly by additional labour rather than 
capital per acre) and by employing more of the labour force in agricultural sector. 
China’s technological achievements were stimulated by long term growth of both 
domestic consumption and trade. By the end of the Ming dynasty (1368-1644) 
China had high levels of urbanisation for a pre-industrial society. Cloth spinning 
and weaving became the largest handicraft industry of which in 1750 China’s share 
of global manufacturing output was 33% compared with 25% India and only 18% 
of Europe (Girdner, & Siddiqui, 2008; Bairoch, 1982). 
Unlike Europe, historically in imperial China the state did not share power with 
other interest groups such as merchants and religious institutions. China never had 
organised religion as witnessed in Europe. Merchants in China were not organised 
as a class with a collective voice to promote their interests but sought to obtain 
favour through individual contact. Confucian philosophy and ideas shaped China 
for a long time and the state was not required to share power with other socio-
economic classes (Nolan, 2005; Siddiqui, 1989). 
On the question of Chinese economy and per capita output growth in the mid-
19th century a question remains about whether China improved or declined. Some 
earlier studies claim that per capita output has declined (Brandt, 1989). However, 
most recent studies have contradicted this view. According to Myers (1991) 
“foreign and interregional trade in North China speeded up commercialisation and 
enabled family farms to maintain their same per capita income overtime, even as 
population steadily rose” (Myers, 1991:604). It was also found that property 
holdings were unequal and the rich rural people extracted a large amount of 
surplus, but did not invest in technology to improve labour productivity. Brandt 
(1989) argues that increased market integration started by the third-quarter of the 
19th century. As a result commodity prices were changed and domestic producers 
and farmers began to specialise in order to take advantage of financial incentives 
arising from markets. He estimated that in central and eastern China, the 
agricultural output rose nearly 1.5% annually. Commercialisation in agriculture 
increased in this region during the last quarters of the 19th century (Brandt, 1989). 
In market system, which is characterised by trade in subsistence goods, the rural 
households sold their goods and services in the market, while the rural factor 
markets for land and credits were greatly constrained by customs and feudal 
institutions meaning the market was far from competitive. As Huang (1990) notes, 
“The fact that the product as well as factor markets of the delta in the late imperial 
and Republican periods indicate not transformative development but involution: 
peasant marketing consisted chiefly of the exchange of subsistence necessities with 
little two-way trade between town and country; peasant households marketed more 
for rent payments and survival needs than for enterprise; and peasants borrowed 
more for emergencies and survival than for productive investment” (Huang, 1990: 
112).  
 TER, 2(2), K. Siddiqui, p.49-87. 
55 
 
Turkish Economic Review 
Rawski (1972) studied manufacturing output growth for various sectors such as 
handicraft, construction, transportation, finance, and agriculture. He finds 
increasing per capita consumption of cotton cloth and increasing wages in both 
agriculture and manufacturing sectors. He emphasises that the Chinese economy in 
the beginning of the 20th century grew about 20-25% (GDP in inflation adjusted 
output per head) (Rawski, 1972). He estimated capital stock over the two decades 
and found higher figures than previously estimated implying that the composition 
of capital and labour significantly changed. However, innovation in the economy 
was slow, which might be positively related to its highly competitive product and 
factor market system. Not much technical change was observed in industries like 
tea, sugar and silk because of highly competitive market structures. Thus, the 
Chinese economy began to take off by 1910, by breaking the economic structure 
based on mainly agriculture.  
In our discussion we should not ignore the unique culture and values of Chinese 
people, where Confucius has played an important role not only in China but for the 
East Asian region. Historically, China’s culture and values have been influenced by 
Confucian ideas and philosophy. In the past for long periods, Confucian thinking 
has had a profound impact on Chinese bureaucrats and ruling elites. The impact of 
Confucian philosophy has been the most powerful social and cultural factor 
throughout the East Asian regions. “Confucius believed that human nature [was] in 
need of development and continuous transformation, and he believed that human 
development and transformation could only take place through continuous learning 
and education” (Dahlgaard-Park, 2006:228).Culture does have influence in shaping 
the norms and work ethics, which has consequences for institutions. For example, 
China’s culture does seems to have been influenced by Confucian philosophy, 
especially respect for authority and family and social stability maintained by the 
rulers is seen as important. Confucian philosophy is claimed to have been the main 
factor behind the economic success in China and earlier achievements of the other 
East Asian countries. 
 
3. Market Intervention Policies since 1980s 
Under the developmental state the government takes an active role in guiding 
the development in close cooperation with businesses. The pattern of economic 
development that some countries have followed is termed by academics as the 
“developmental state” (Nee et al, 2007). In Chinese case Bolesta (2007) notes, 
“China has adopted similar developmental approach to that followed by Japan 
during Meiji era and by Germany’s Bismarck in relation to their country’s 
economic development. These countries followed as state designed a 
developmental path and until now have been favouring state interventionism over a 
liberal open market…. The developmental state is often conceptually positioned 
between a liberal open economy and a central planned model” (Bolesta, 2007:105). 
After the Communist Party unified the country in 1949, it launched land 
reforms and collectivisation measures, which eliminated private property rights for 
households. Finally, such policies did undermine the role of traditional rural elites. 
During the period from 1950 to 1978 the rural workforce were largely confined in 
the production of grain and expansion of irrigation and water control. China’s 
farmers were locked into a system where procurement targets had been kept high 
and procurement prices low, leaving them little enthusiasm to invest in agriculture. 
However, non-agricultural activities which improved the income of rural labourers 
of the past were neglected. The rural households were unable to make choices as 
they did in the past.  
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In 1978 China made the decision to initiate market reforms under the leadership 
of Deng Xiaoping. The Communist Party decided to make changes in institutions 
to promote market friendly environment as it was considered necessary to achieve 
higher growth rates (Tisdell, 2009). For an adequate understanding of the economic 
changes, analysis of institutions would be helpful to the economist and provides 
comprehensive evidence about the outcome and the process as well as explaining 
under what conditions it happened. As North argues, “The economic institutions 
we have that shape directly our world drive from political institutions. Economists 
do not like to think that they are dependent on political science but they are. As 
well recognising the formal rules like constitutions, laws, rules and regulations, we 
are interested in who makes the rules and for whom” (North, 2003:3). The decision 
to dissolve rural communes was initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1980 and aimed at 
strengthening the rural family. The rights of village communes increased. The 
holders of land had the right to “rent” to other farmers but not to sell. This 
encouraged young to migrate to cities and also meant larger operational area for 
farmers who chose to stay in rural areas. At the same time it encouraged 
specialised production to cultivate high value crops. With the launching of pro-
market reform policies, agricultural output began to surge, which was facilitated by 
higher prices and increased availability of modern inputs such as chemical 
fertilizers. 
The Communist Party of China took a decision to initiate economic reforms 
first with agriculture as it was then seen as the foundation of the national economy. 
To assist this process laws were changed along with decentralisation and resource 
ownership in the agricultural sector. Later on these reforms were extended to the 
rest of the economy. In the 1980s shifts in policy meant with the expansion of 
village industries and also the arrival of more capital investment and the growth of 
overseas markets. Increased investment in capital stocks in rural industries also 
created more job opportunities for rural households. Huang terms this new 
development as “rural industrialisation without residential urbanisation” and “new 
market opportunity” (Huang, 1990:288). Since 1980 China’s rural areas have 
served as the key supplier of a cheap labour force to expanding industries, 
undermining the bargaining power of the urban working class. 
The Chinese government playeda very active role in steering the general 
direction of all economic reforms. In 1992, Den Xiaoping visited south coastal 
regions and assured both foreign investors and Chinese entrepreneurs that pro-
market reform and open door polices will continue. A number of institutional 
reforms were carried out in order to attract foreign investment, which rose from 
merely US$2.2 billion in 1980 to US$10 billion in 1992 and thereafter rose rapidly 
to US$30 billion in 1993. And in 1997 China became the largest recipient of 
foreign capital among the developing countries i.e. more than US$40 billion was 
invested in China annually. Further in 2005, China became the 3rd largest recipient 
of foreign capital in the world after US and the UK. As a proportion of GDP, 
foreign capital only contributed to 3-4% of total investment but still played a 
crucial role in the country’s drive towards modernisation and industrialisation, 
particularly in upgrading technology and in general spreading of technology. 
Foreign capital also contributed towards integration of Chinese businesses with the 
global economy. Gary Jefferson (2008) argues, “China’s government has played a 
central and on-going role in the economy’s transition ...China’s ruling party and 
central government have remained intact with the legitimacy and administrative 
capacity to steer China’s economic transition and development. China’s 
government has played a central role in reassessing property rights from the state to 
individuals and thereby incentivising China’s economic growth” (Jefferson, 
2008:5-6). 
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The Chinese government considers some sectors as “strategic sectors”, 
industries that are seen as important to national security and to its infrastructure, 
security and technological advancement. In fact, China attracts more FDI than any 
other country, but it does not mean that it has the most liberalised economy. 
Academics argue that the ‘developmental state’of China has adopted new domestic 
and global realities. Some argue that China had become a ‘developmental state’ as 
its other East Asian neighbours had done it few decades earlier: land reforms, 
strong state, emphasis on exports, and state and bureaucracy working in close 
cooperation (Nee et al, 2007; White, 1993), while other academics are sceptical 
about it. China’s patterns of state regulation are different as sectors are tied to the 
strategic value framework, rather than statist impulse to limit foreign capital and 
pursue industrial policies to suit its national and strategic interests (Breslin. 2010). 
The predominant explanation has been put forward by the developmental state 
theory. Gerschenkron (1962) argues that countries, which have launched 
industrialisation later on such as Germany and United States, had a different 
pattern of development which was not due to cultural reasons. Kim (2009) argues 
that, “the developmental state fundamentally requires relative income equality as 
the initial socio-economic condition. Some of the Northeast Asian countries (e.g. 
Japan Taiwan and Korea) undertook radical land reforms that dramatically 
equalised income in society. While most Southeast Asian countries inherited 
“extractive colonial institutions” that perpetuated income inequality, Korea and 
Taiwan were able to break away from the colonial legacy, which allowed the 
emergence of the developmental state... the success of East Asian tigers – with 
Japan as pioneer, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore as models, and China as the a 
tiger still waking up – was largely a result of the crucial role played by the state” 
(Kim, 2009: 383). 
However, the state must also have an ability to insulate itself from particular 
interests in society such as seen Japan’s Ministry of International and Trade 
Industry (MITI) or Korea’s Economic Planning Board (EPB) (Amsden, 1989). The 
state-directed industrial policy is not just limited to East Asian countries but also 
followed in the 19th century by European countries when they were initiating their 
modern industrial expansion. As Chang (2002) emphasises, state intervention is not 
restricted to East Asia, but also followed by all successful economies in their early 
periods of industrialisation e.g. the UK, Germany and the USA. Rodrik (1995) 
points out that growth in East Asia can be largely attributed to rapid accumulation 
and investment rather than industrial policy (Krugman, 2010). In some East Asian 
countries land reforms did manage to remove or undermine colonial legacy and 
helped to build greater rural income equality, which later on proved to be 
favourable for economic development and industrialisation. As in earlier decades 
South Korea, Singapore and Taiwan and most recently China pursued a 
mercantilist path to modernise their economies. As stated: “In foreign trade our 
principle is to encourage exports and organise imports according to needs” (Beijing 
Review, 1990). The government promoted exports through varieties of subsidies 
policy, at the same time imports were strictly controlled. “The pattern of exports 
and imports appears to be determined more by administrative decisions at the 
industrial bureau or foreign trade corporation level than by incentives at the level 
of the individual enterprise” (World Bank, 1985: 106). 
The most important changes in policy matters were seen when in the early 
1980s the government attempted to create a professional bureaucracy in China, 
which were supposed to have positive attitudes towards market reforms. Similar 
policies were adopted in the 19th century by Bismarck inGermany, Meiji Japan and 
in the third quarter of the 20th century by South Korea and Taiwan both by active 
state support to build industrialisation and to a create a professional bureaucracy 
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which could play a positive role towards implementing government stated policies 
(Siddiqui, 2013a). Such attempt was made by the Chinese government in 1980s, 
which seems to be extraordinary, “The speed of organisational turnover, and the 
relative ease with which it has occurred, has been impressive…Chinese 
bureaucracy now has a greater ability and willingness to bring technical 
competence to bear on competing policy alternatives” (Harding, 1987: 208-9). 
Economic reforms in China have reduced bureaucratic control over state 
enterprises. It means turning away from using direct budgetary allocations and 
household deposit as the primary source of funds for propping up SOEs. The SOEs 
have to rely on bank credit with the hope that this increases incentives and 
efficiency. Reforms also provided managers more autonomy and allowed 
companies to keep a large share of its profits for bonuses and further investments. 
Direct state subsidies were replaced by bank loans and self-financing (Jacques, 
2009). 
 
4. Economic Growth, Investments and Savings  
China’s dramatic growth today is the result of various factors such as 
government policies, global environment, savings and investments. Since the 1980s 
China’s economic progress has been phenomenal. As a result its GDP was over 13 
times higher in 2007 than in 1980. According to a World Bank estimate China’s 
GDP was US$ 157.7 billion in 1978 and it rose to US$ 2100 billion in 2007. 
China’s gross exports were about 14% of its GDP, which increased to 40% of the 
GDP by 2007. Figure 1 shows real and per capita GDP growth between 2006 and 
2015. Furthermore due to hardly any population growth, per capita income has 
risen sharply since reforms were undertaken (World Bank, 2008:7). 
 
 
Figure 1: Real GDP Growth and Per Capita GDP: 2006-2015 
Source: Euro monitor International; Note: Data for 2014 and 2015 are forecast (GDP per capita are in 
constant 2013 prices). 
 
East Asian crisis did slow down growth rates in the region in post-1997 period. 
However, then China was less integrated into the region’s economy. As a result, a 
lot of capital and technology was diverted towards China into upgrading its 
infrastructure, which besides removing what is called critical obstructions to 
growth process, also provided avenues for higher rates of return on investments 
(Vincelette et al 2011).This led to a rapid increase in inputs into the economy i.e. 
China invested a high proportion of national income compared to many developing 
economies. In the past three decades, economic development in China has been 
largely dependent on investment. To maintain the growth of investment, China 
must sustain higher rates of profit, which most likely could be achieved with the 
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help by reducing labour share of income to sustain profitability. Overall labour has 
experienced a decline of its share from 51.4% in 1999 to 42.2% in 2007 (Qi, 2014).  
The policy initiative towards very high capital investment, which accounted for 
54% of the growth lead of the East Asian countries over the developed 
industrialised countries and for 62% of the lead over the developing countries. 
High capital investment seems far more important than productivity increases in 
explaining East Asian countries growth lead over advanced industrial countries. 
China’s pattern of very high capital accumulation seems most advanced case of the 
Asian success. As Vu argues, “The pattern showing the stronger expansion of fixed 
investment relative to GDP was even more notable for China, which was the most 
rapidly growing economy in the region during 1990-2010” (Vu, 2013: 196). 
Further Vu notes, “The emergence of Asia… is the great economic achievement of 
our time. This has created a new model of economic growth built on globalization 
and the patient accumulation of human and non-human capital” (Vu, 2013, p.vii).  
There is no doubt that China has experienced phenomenal growth. Despite its 
so-called weak institutions, which are seen to be so crucial by the mainstream 
economists for rapid growth andefficiency. Furthermore, neo-classical economists 
base their arguments on efficiency criteria, while overlooking distributional 
consequences. In order for growth to be sustainable for longer periods, it should 
involve the continuous introduction of new products along with increased 
investment in high technology; infrastructure and diversification of the economic 
activities. China has experienced rapid growth rates for more than three decades, 
also has a massive investment of around 40%-50% of the GDP and a closer 
integration into the world economy. 
The Chinese ‘reform and opening up’ process began with exceptionally high 
levels of investment as a proportion of GDP and this has been on a rising trend.  
Although other factors are important, this is the main driving force behind the 
differential in growth and the change in living standards. Table 1 shows that 
China’s investment as a percentage of GDP has been much higher than the other 
emerging economies such as India (Siddiqui, 2014a). We also find that total 
amount of investment has risen in China’s case between 2006 and 2010; while for 
India it has declined slightly for the same period. (See Table 1) Compared to major 
developed economies i.e. G7, China’s domestic investment is more than double 
(Siddiqui, 2009c). 
 
Table 1: Gross Capital Formation (investment) as percentage of GDP 
 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
China 43 42 44 48 45 
India 36 38 35 36 32 
G7 average 21 21 20 17.5 17 
Source: World Bank Database, 2011a 
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Figure 2: China's Fixed Investment (annual % increase in inflation adjusted dollar prices – 
3 year moving average) 
Source: United Nations, National Accounts Statistics, 2014; World Bank, 2014. 
 
The proportion of national output going to investment is quite high compared to 
other emerging economies and nearly twice of the average of developed countries. 
The high rate of investment in the economy allowed the exploitation of low paid 
workers. Along with the high rate of savings and better increased availability of 
bank finance led to further availability of capital to be invested domestically. The 
huge increase in spending in infrastructure, rising employment and along with 
massive expansion of credits led to maintain the domestic demands in the economy 
and to certain extent lessened the consequences of the 2008 financial crisis 
(Siddiqui, 2009b). From 2000 to 2010 the investment grew annually around 13.3%, 
as shown in Figure 2, while the share of private consumption rose only to 7.8%. As 
a result the share of private consumption in GDP declined from 46% to 34% for the 
same period. (Wolf, 2011) Moreover wages as a proportion of national income 
declined from 56.5% in 1983 to 36.7% in 2005. 
The public sector still leads in investment spending. However, in recent years 
private sector investment and research and development spending has been 
increasing. The growth performance of the economy depends on technical progress 
also called total factor productivity (TFP). Along with this, investment in higher 
education on biotechnology and agriculture is taking place both by the public and 
private sector, meaning that TFP growth will be higher in future.  In 2008, a 
government stimulus package of US$ 570 billion was injected, in addition to the 
state controlled banks, to increase their industries and local government.  
China’s has a remarkably high rate of saving, which reached 50% of GDP in 
2013. This seems to be more than the country can invest at home, meaning that it 
has to resort to exporting some of its saving overseas. Credit in China has increased 
from about 100% of GDP in 2008 to about 135% of GDP in 2013 (The Economist, 
2014). China’s high investment has been financed by rising credits. However, this 
increased in credits has not resulted in rapid inflation. Because investment was 
largely took place in raising productive capacity of the economy. Martin Jacques 
(2009) argues that China has a distinctive culture, history and civilisation, which is 
rooted in its long history on the organisation of the economy, society and 
government and as China improves its economy, these views and her experiences 
will be most likely reflected in the formulation of its future policies.  
China’s savings have increased rapidly particularly during the last decade e.g. 
from 37% in 2000 to 50% of GDP in 2008. Corporate saving rose sharply reaching 
at peak in 2004, since then it slightly fell. However, household saving has risen to 
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25% of their income in 2008 (Yongding, 2012).As shown in the Figure 3 China’s 
total savings rate has fallen from 53.2% of GDP in 2009 to 51.4% of GDP in 2012 
and further to 50% in 2013. It is important to note that total savings are not only 
those of households but also company savings and the ‘negative savings’ of the 
government budget deficit. 
 
 
Figure 3: Savings as a percentage of national income in China 
Source: Development Indicators, World Bank, 2014. 
 
Saving rates gone up in China compared to pre-reforms period, perhaps due to 
decline in the availability of public provision of pension and health care for the 
rural population; also the post-reform period privatisation of urban housing and the 
expansion of investment opportunities opened new avenues to make money (Ma, & 
Yi, 2010)  For most of the products, consumer prices are determined by market 
forces, despite the fact that government still regulate prices of telecommunications, 
energy, utilities and financial services.Corporate savings have contributed the 
larger part of total savings. As Ma and Yi (2010) found that savings amounted to 
53% of GDP, out of which savings by firms were 18.8%, government 11%, and 
households’ contribution was 23.4% in 2008. 
The higher growth in China has largely taken place due to higher rate of 
investment. The investment rate in China (as a share of GDP) has fluctuated around 
35-45%. In infrastructure, which played a critical role, it has averaged 19% of the 
GDP for last two decades. It is often said that China can offer this because it has 
attracted a large amount of foreign capital. However, a closer look at it, we find 
that foreign capital has accounted for only 3-5% of GDP in China for the same 
period, in recent years it has reached peak at 8%. In the period 2000-2010, foreign 
capital accounted for only 6% of domestic investment. It is now known that most 
of the foreign capital inflows did not add to domestic investment, but has largely 
led to further accumulation of international reserves, which, for instance, is 
increasing at the rate of US$ 100 billion annually. 
The rapid rise in foreign investment in the 1990s has been mainly due to the 
overall trend of the amount of FDI into the developing countries rising during this 
period; in the post-Tiananmen square period political stability was restored and 
China was seen as less risky by foreign investors; FDI was also boosted by the 
creation of SEZs in the coastal regions of south-east along with special tax 
concessions, land-leasing legislation and other attractive measures for investors in 
capital regions. All these measures did make China a very attractive place for 
foreign capital.The inflows of foreign capital had increased as the country opened 
new areas for foreign investors, which were not available before, like finance, 
telecommunications, and other services. It dramatically rose in the 1990s, which 
coincided with the overall inflow of capital into developing countries’ economies 
surging (Lardy, 1995). The rising domestic market has continued to attract 
manufactures, but rises in labour costs and, more recently, rises in strikes in foreign 
companies, could encourage foreign companies to move to lower cost countries 
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like Vietnam, Bangladesh and Thailand (Davies, 2012). China’s share of exports in 
GDP has decreased from 39.1% in 2006 to 29.4% in 2010. The country’s growth is 
highly dependent on export markets. Due to low productivity, China compared to 
other developing countries requires to maintain low wages in order to be 
internationally competitive. As a result in 2008 thousands of factories closed down 
in Guangdong and moved to interior regions in China or to Vietnam (Davies, 
2012). 
 
Table 2: China’s Capital inflows and outflows, 2008-2010 (billions of US$). 
 2008 2009 2010 
Flows of Foreign Investment    
% world inward 6.2 8.0 8.5 
% world outward 2.7 4.8 5.1 
Stocks of foreign investment    
% world inward 2.5 2.6 3.0 
% world outward 0.9 1.2 1.5 
Source: Davies, Ken (2012) Inward FDI in China and its Policy Context, Columbia University. URL: 
http://hdl.handle.net/10022/AC:P:15269 Series: Columbia FDI Profiles. 
 
In recent years, new trends can be seen with the outflows of Chinese capital, see 
Table 2. It has been largely through state and its sovereign wealth fund (i.e. China 
Investment Corporation) - private enterprise only accounts very small proportion 
i.e. 0.6% of the total outward of capital (Clark & Monk, 2011). China has become a 
major participant in international capital markets. The amount of foreign capital 
outflows grew from modest amount of a few hundred millions of US dollars in the 
1990s to several billions by 2013. China had an advantage factor due to its 
proximity to Hong Kong and Taiwan. It is well established now that capital, 
technology and expertise from both countries played a very important role in 
modernising and establishing the manufacturing industries in the coastal regions. I 
mean to suggest that capital, technology and experiences from the competitive 
environment contributed positively in Guangdong and Fujian provinces. Also 
China had long past experience of entrepreneurship, commerce and trade. Jiangnan 
and Guangdong provinces already had advanced capitalist production prior to the 
industrial revolution in Western Europe. (Xu & Wu, 1985) 
As industrial output rose in 1990s, the composition of Chinese exports changed 
from labour intensive low tech products such as textiles, toys and shoes to higher 
value products such as computers, mobile phones and machine tools etc.According 
to official statistics China’s net exports declined from 8.8% of GDP in 2007 to 
2.6% in 2011. At the same time the share of investment over the same period, from 
42% of GDP to 48%, which appears to be higher, compared to both emerging and 
developed economies. China’s growth rates have slowed down from 10 % in the 
past decade to 7% in 2013. 
China’s economic expansion has been phenomenal and by 2005 it had become 
the world’s leading producer of important products such as more than 100 kinds of 
various manufactured products, including 50% of cameras, 30 % of TVs and 25% 
of washing machines, 20% of fridges. Domestic consumption in China has also 
increased rapidly as Waldmeir and Reed (2011) notes, “No country on the earth has 
ever bought so many cars in so little time as China” (Waldmeir & Reed, 2011). 
China’s growth in exports has been much more rapid, involving dramatic increase 
in world market share.In Latin America too China’s exports have risen sharply in 
recent years. For example, imports by Brazil have increased more than 18-fold 
within the last ten years and account for 12.5% of China’s exports. For example, 
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trade with India has risen sharply as well, from US$ 3 billion in 2000 to US$ 62 
billion in 2011, making China India’s largest trading partner. China’s major export 
markets are still the US and EU, which accounts for respectively 18.4% and 19.7% 
of its total exports in 2011.  
In Latin America imports of steel were surging in 2012. Latin America 
imported US$ 3.51 billion worth of steel from China. Such a recent development 
now threatens the value chain of industry in Mexico. For instance, Mexican 
imports of rolled sheets from China increased by nearly 141% during the 1911-12. 
The reason behind this rapid change is that Chinese automakers soon plan to 
assemble, produce and export vehicles to Mexico and take advantage of the 
NAFTA treaty. Also overall demand for steel is increasing because of the 
expanding automobile industry in Mexico whose output is exported to North 
American markets. China also imports raw materials from Latin America such as 
copper, crude oil and agricultural products such as soybeans and exporting cheap 
manufactured goods to the region. Moreover, the Mexican manufacturing sector is 
increasingly facing threats from China’s cheap exports. Exports by foreign 
subsidiaries are largely for carrying out product assembly of imported parts and 
components. Also Chinese exporting companies are using parts and components 
supplied by or purchased from foreign subsidiaries. Total processed exports rose to 
US$ 57 billion in 1994, which was about 50% of the Chinese total exports. These 
foreign owned companies are producing products like machinery, electronics and 
textiles. 
Efficiency gains are occurring not only from economies of scale, but from 
increased international competition, which is leading towards technical exchange 
and managerial and organisational efficiencies. It is well known that China’s 
exports have risen dramatically for the last three decades. Not only has the 
commodity composition of exports items changed towards manufactured goods, 
but also increasing productivity has spread to state owned industries. Moreover, 
government has played an important role in coordinating economic activities, while 
insulating them from external shocks and facilitating Chinese firms taking over 
foreign companies to access brand names, technology and foreign markets. 
 
5. Renminibi and Exchange Rate  
Chinese currency RMB (Renminibi) has often been said to be undervalued and 
created huge trade surpluses for China (Krugman, 2010). The US dollar-Renminibi 
exchange rate policy is of pegging Renminibi against the dollar at a level that keeps 
China’s exports relatively cheap. The United States complain that it gives Chinese 
firms an advantage and argue that Chinese currency should be allowed to float 
freely on markets, meaning substantial revaluation of Renminibi. China had fixed 
the exchange rate at 8.27 RMB per US dollar in 1997. In 2005 the officially fixed 
RMB-dollar rate ended due to US pressure. This led the RMB to appreciate 
immediately and it has been subject to gradual appreciation since then. In 2007 the 
Chinese government allowed foreign currency to be held by private individuals and 
domestic companies. However, this did not lead to a rapid increase in demand for 
foreign currency because strong domestic growth and the expectations of RMB 
appreciation kept the currency speculation and potential capital flight in check.  
China is now starting to face the shadow banking sector’s contribution to credit 
growth becoming more pronounced. During the last decade the experience of India 
and China provided a useful lesson for developing countries in the importance of 
some sort of financial regulation and gradual liberalisation. Dornbuschand and 
Helmers (1988) argues that running a current account surplus means exporting 
capital. It does not make much sense for developing economies country to lend 
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money to developed economies and their capital resources need to be used for their 
domestic investment (Siddiqui, 2013b).Increased investment would lead to the 
improvements of living conditions and incomes of their people. Following this 
arguments, for example, China as a developing economy with a low per capita 
income GDP, should be running a current account deficit. China lending money to 
developed countries seems beyond the economic logic. China lends money to US 
at much lower returns, for instance, US companies’ average returns on investment 
in China was 33%, while China’s return on US government securities was less than 
3% in 2008. Due to a recent slide of the US dollar, China’s net foreign exchange 
reserves have experienced losses in value.  
China has a current account surplus of the balance of payments and its surplus 
has contributed to the building up of its foreign exchange reserves. This has created 
huge trade surplus and China has become the largest holder of foreign exchange 
reserves. Its trade surplus is invested via the purchase of government debt. The 
East Asian crisis shows us that financial and capital market liberalisation was 
adopted hurriedly without properly putting a regulatory framework into place. 
Those developing countries such as China and Malaysia, with strong controls on 
capital flows were less adversely affected (Siddiqui, 2012; Stiglitz, 2000).  
Changes in the financial accounts have had impact on the exchange rate. Under 
such circumstances the RMB rate experienced downward pressure and it led to 
depreciation of the currency from 6.30 to a US dollar in April 2012 to 6.41 in 
August 2012. However, the rate reverted and RMB appreciated again to 6.31 to 
1US dollar by January 2013. The Chinese balance of payment (BOP) witnessed 
spectacular increases in its trade surplus, along with a huge rise in net capital 
inflows into the country. Trade surplus did experience a slight fall in 2009 due to 
financial crisis in US and EU countries. In 2012 the Chinese government agreed to 
a daily trading limit of the currency against dollar was officially widened from 
0.5% to 1%. This was supposed to bring an increased role for market forces and 
also encourage wider use of the currency in international markets. Capital market 
liberalisation encourages speculation and may lead to short-term speculative capital 
flows. It is said foreign investment is crucial because such investment brings with it 
capital resources such as new technology, access to foreign markets, trains 
personnel, improves overall human capital and raises the degree of competition in 
domestic markets (World Bank, 1999).  
Contrary to this, mainstream economists argue that the role of state should be 
minimal since external influence could distort the allocation mechanism, and 
dampen investment incentives. This could result in lower growth and ultimately 
lead to Pareto inefficiency. Mainstream economists see capital liberalisation as 
same as the arguments for trade liberalisation, which logically seems to be 
incorrect. Capital market liberalisation brings greater instability in developing 
countries, primarily due to the fact that capital flows are markedly pro-cyclical, 
exacerbating economic fluctuations. Stiglitz has expressed, “Capital market 
liberalisation exposes countries to vicissitudes associated with changes in 
economic circumstances outside the country; a sudden change in lenders’ 
perception concerning “emerging market risk” can lead to huge capital outflows, 
undermining the viability of the entire financial system” (Stiglitz, 2000: 1079-
1080). He further warns that “Key issues are not capital flowing into the country 
but flowing out. “China was able to pursue active counter cyclical macro-policies, 
staving off a recession and maintaining robust growth of close to 8% because of 
capital account restrictions provided it some room to manoeuvre. It had no need to 
raise interest rates to levels that killed the economy in order to “save” it from 
capital flight” (Stiglitz, 2000: 1080).  
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China has remained outside of financial liberalisation and its banking sector is 
completely under government control and focuses on internal credit markets. 
Management of Renminibi is still country’s sovereign decision, rather than being 
completely left to market forces. Capital liberalisation may lead to another adverse 
effect on growth. The developing countries are advised to maintain adequate 
reserves to protect themselves from the volatility of the international financial 
markets. The reserves should be in foreign currency and falling levels could send 
panic signals to investors and thus could have an adverse impact on market 
confidence. 
The country witnessed unprecedented investment and export-led growth from 
2001 to 2008, but since then a weakening in export demand due to financial crisis 
has had a negative impact. To correct this situation the Chinese government 
launched a massive fiscal stimulus through investment in infrastructure and 
housing sectors, which has got its own limits. It is largely financed by local 
authorities via local government finance systems, exposing local governments’ 
finances to the vagaries of the land-lease markets. Under such circumstances, 
financial stability may have assumed a much greater priority than growth per se. 
The rising domestic debt issues in China seem not to have received enough 
attention. Domestic debts have been rising in China in recent years. See Figure 4. 
However, first we will consider how housing costs have continued to rise in 
metropolitan cities especially in western regions. For instance, apartment prices in 
Beijing and Shanghai rose between 50% and 60% just between 2009 and 2012. It 
seems that property bubble is developing. Average house prices are more than ten 
times the average household’s income in 2012. The local government has 
accumulated huge debts i.e. 27% of the country’s total income. Easy credits have 
also been provided to state owned enterprises and according to an estimate around 
40% of which remain loss making (Evans-Pritchard, 2011). 
 
 
Figure 4:China’s Public Debt from 2006-2013 
Source: Euro monitor International; Note: Data are in constant 2013 prices 
 
Corporate debt has risen in recent years. According to Standard and Poor’s 
recent estimation on the size of corporate debts, it was US$ 12 trillion or 120% of 
the country’s total output in 2013. A large part of these loans has been financed 
with investment in trust products issued by the banks. According to the People’s 
Bank of China (PBC) loans provided by the trust companies increased by an 
average of 23% annually to reach US$ 2.9 trillion or 30% total credit given last 
year (Financial Time, 14thMarch, 2014).  
The second largest loan receivers were local governments where the money was 
borrowed from sources like the China Development Bank and also from trusts to 
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finance infrastructure and other developmental projects in the provinces. A large 
amount of credits has been channelled into the real estate sector, which could be 
speculative for the most part. Recently, lower demand has meant that a large 
number of these properties are unoccupied. This means property prices will 
increase at a lower rate than expected. Investments are financed by credits that 
need to be repaid.  
However, recently China has chosen to liberalise its financial sector rather than 
controlling the speculative capital. This seems to be the biggest financial challenge 
the Chinese government will face in the future. The financial system in China still 
remains heavily under the control of state and the authorities control financial 
flows to regulate the volume of credit as well as direct credit to priority sectors in 
the domestic economy. China seems to be sceptical about capital account 
liberalisation. The recent history of emerging economies shows that capital flows 
are strongly pro-cyclical and have been biggest single cause of financial instability. 
This could have a large impact on economic performance.  
Rising corporate debt and debt default is a big challenge facing China, which I 
think has not been properly focused on and examined. The recent two cases of debt 
default, although not very major, are illustrative of overall rising corporate debt, 
which was estimated to be US$12 trillion in 2013. Most of these loans are provided 
by the trust companies and account for 30% of the credit advanced last year. For 
instance, in March 2014 Shanxi Haixin Iron and Steel Company, the largest private 
steel producer in China, defaulted bank loans of US$ 3.57 billion. It prompts 
speculation that such development hasan adverse impact on the country’s 
economy, precipitated by an internal meltdown of the banking sector despite the 
fact that it was a relatively small steel producer compared with state owned 
companies. Earlier small companies such as Shanghai Chaori Solar Energy Science 
and Technology failed to repay its debt commitment of US$ 14.5 million. This 
could indicate an emerging trend, which could, potentially spiral into adebt crisis. 
So far china has refrained from capital account convertibility and the value of 
Renminibi is managed by the central bank. Moreover, the banking system is fully 
under national control and focuses on the internal credit market and working to 
meet the need of domestic businesses (Wolf, 2014a).   
On the mounting issue of China’s debt and credit cycle Hyman Minsky points 
out that panic can take hold of financial markets following a period of stability, 
while others adhere to the view that China’s huge debt possesses no major 
problems to the future development of the economy (Wolf, 2014b). A rising 
proportion of investment was being funded by debt, but returns were falling. It is 
also true that Chinese private sector agents have borrowed to fund investment 
rather than consumption. Firms are the main borrowers and the country is not 
dependent on foreign creditors and also the Renminibi is not freely convertible into 
foreign currency. China has also imposed exchange control. Domestic creditors 
cannot take their money out of the country. Unlike Japan in early 1990s, China has 
a relatively underdeveloped economy and vast amount of labour and resources are 
underutilized. China adopted a policy towards the financial and banking sector, 
similar to that adopted earlier by Japan, because Japan had witnessed an impressive 
growth between 1950 and 1991. Japan’s financial policy was geared as an 
instrument of industrial policy designed to transfer surplus capital to the big 
industries with active state intervention and close cooperation between politicians, 
bureaucrats and businesses. Bank-centred corporate governance model where 
banks played a significant role in the growth and management of big companies 
was applicable (Hutton, 2006). 
One obvious way of dealing with these bubbles is to take the excessive liquidity 
out through tighter monetary policy and financial regulation. This will require a 
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policy in favour of more sustainable increase in consumption based on increased 
wages and productive investments and that will raise productivity and expand the 
ability to produce. Increasing financial regulation will force the banks to lend to 
more productive and efficient enterprises. Such few isolated cases may develop 
into a bigger problem especially when large excess capacities financed with the 
easily available credits, potentially posing problems in the future. The existence of 
excess capacity and falls in demand could occur due to a slowdown in domestic 
growth and the global economy. Such increasing excess capacity is not only found 
in steel sector, but also solar power and real estate. Such policies are surprising 
because just a few months earlier government intervened to bail out an investors’ 
trust product or security issued by China Credit Trust, one among several “shadow 
banking” companies. It attracted investment of US$ 490 million, but proved risky 
because it was backed by loans to coal mining company, which went bust, although 
losses to investors such as foregone interest and principal capital were fully repaid 
(Wolf, 2014b; Davies, 2012). Of course, according to mainstream economist’s 
opinion, it is contrary to sound market discipline and a healthy credit market to 
intervene in this way! 
Despite this potential default, in China debt default has not been common 
feature and has been very rarely seen in the past. China has witnessed a huge credit 
boom in the last few years, especially after the global financial crisis. Potential 
default was seen as less important because government in the past intervened to 
bail out potential defaulters and thus remove any adverse signals to the markets. In 
the past state was seen as standing as guarantor against any forthcoming financial 
difficulties, which is important instrument for sustaining investment led growth. 
This in turn encouraged a belief that the state implicitly guaranteed to come the aid 
of an ailing business to safeguard the economy and the financial sector. However, 
recent events show a change occurring in government policy, allowing market 
forces a greater impact, increasing the potential of actual private sector business 
default (Wolf, 2014b; Evans-Pritchard, 2011).  
 
6. Trade and Comparative Advantage 
The mainstream economists, given their support for neoliberal policy strategy to 
achieve higher growth rates, would prioritise dismantling quantitative restriction on 
imports, reducing import tariffs, convertibility of currency, reducing red tape and 
so on. Contrary to these suggestions, China largely ignored these recommendations 
and was slow to open its trade i.e.itfollowed step-by step liberalisation polices. The 
development of new technology and globalisation led to a huge transformation in 
global trade and impetus was given to global fragmentation of production. Under 
this, manufacturing process is divided into many stages. The fragmented 
production is carried out in different locations in several countries in order to cut 
down the costs and achieve economies of scale. Under such circumstances each 
country specialises in different segments of the economic production chain. This 
led to fragmentation of production and in the past decade or so trade is dominated 
by trade in components (Das, 2012; Nolan, 2002). 
With the adoption of reforms, some argue that Chinese business have 
specialised on the basis of comparative advantage as advocated by David Ricardo 
in 1817 (Das, 2012; Lardy, 1995). However, China did not follow a rigid policy, as 
many developing countries did, by specialising and export of primary commodities. 
However, China has used this as a short term strategy and moved towards greater 
diversification and higher value commodities in its export sector. For instance, 
China began in the 1980s by exporting mainly labour intensive manufactured 
goods on the basis of Heckscher-Ohlin model; this mainly consisted of goods such 
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as textiles, footwear and toys. However, in the 1990s exports items increasingly 
moved to higher value products. As a result, from 1980 to 1999, overall exports 
increased from US$ 4.3 billion to US$ 54 billion, an increase of 10.22 times. In 
1980, on the eve of Chinese reforms, total trade was US$ 20 billion and its share of 
the world’s trade was only 0.6%. It rose to US$ 475 billion, when China became 
the 7th largest trading country in the world in 2000 (Vu, 2013; Hausman & Klinger, 
2006). 
However, in each successive decade since reforms were undertaken, China 
initially exported processed primary goods (i.e. labour intensive and light 
manufacturing goods) and such products accounted for three-fourths of its exports, 
which are said to be suitable for production in low income countries. But for the 
last two decades, China did not follow comparative advantages theories, but moved 
towards the production of advanced technological goods such as electronics. As 
Rodrik notes, “China has ended up with an export basket that is significantly more 
sophisticated than what would be normally expected for a country at its income 
level” (Rodrik, 2006:1) 
Production and exports of various commodities require specific capabilities 
such as human resources, institutions, availability of markets etc. (Hausmann & 
Klinger, 2006). China began setting up export-processing zones as a strategy to 
learn from foreign firms; at the same time global restructuring was taking place and 
China did benefit from it. The most important legislation regarding FDI was the 
Equity and Joint Venture legislation of 1979. This resulted in increased incentives 
for investors in China along with low wages and tax concessions amongst others. 
Even today foreign owned businesses are the largest contributors of total exports 
followed by joint ventures and domestic companies. China continues to rely 
heavily on foreign businesses for transfer of technology and they also account for 
larger share of its exports. However, China has been able to bargain effectively 
with foreign companies because of its large market size (McKay & Song, 2010). 
Taiwan and Korea had extensively used state owned enterprises (SOE) in 
creating rapid economic development a few decades earlier. For instance, Korea’s 
steel producer POSCO was set up in the early 1970s, as SOE in a country that does 
not have raw materials (iron and coal) at a time when such an act was a clear 
defiance of comparative advantage; the country then had, as its main export items, 
labour intensive products such as textiles and wigs. However, POSCO became the 
most efficient steel producer in the world within a decade after it was established 
and now it is the second largest steel producer in the world (Chang & Singh, 2003). 
China’s rapid expansion in electronic exports in 1990s, for example, was due to 
foreign companies and increased participation in the global value chain. Of course, 
the government’s previous experience in central production and planning, 
(especially by providing excess to education, health care and egalitarian land 
distribution) underpinned the process (Siddiqui, 2014b). Rodrik (2006) argues, 
“Domestic firms play a significant role in China. In fact, 100% foreign owned 
firms are rarity among the leading players in the industry. Most of the significant 
firm tends to be joint-ventures between foreign firms and domestic (mostly state-
owned) entities” (Rodrik, 2006:19). Similar points have been emphasised by other 
studies. Felipe et al (2013) finds, “For developing countries to move fast in the 
product space and reach the core. They often need to defy their comparative 
advantage as determined by their factor abundance. China’s impressive progression 
and growth after the introduction of market reforms cannot be understood without 
factoring in the capabilities that had been developed and accumulated over the 
three decades under the planning system and prior to the introduction of the market 
reforms. Without these capabilities, entrepreneurs could not respond to the 
incentives created by the market reforms” (Felipe et al, 2013: 809). Even during 
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2008 financial crisis, China still maintained its growth rate with the help of 
domestic fiscal stimulus and did manage to certain extent offset the contractionary 
effects of reduced exports. 
The rapid economic development of the Chinese economy for the last three 
decades or more has been based on China’s ability to accumulate new and more 
complex capabilities and diversify and upgrade its exports. This economic policy 
was not due solely to the impact of market forces, but in large part, to other various 
factors including the government’s strategic policies, strong will to catch-up and 
the favourable international environment. This does not mean that the high growth 
trajectory will continue indefinitely, of course.  
Economic reforms began with the adoption of dual-track price system. It 
provided incentives and played a positive role in the decision making in state 
owned enterprises. As a result, entrepreneurial spirit had been encouraged and 
productivity gains were made. (Yao, 2009) It began with reforms in collective 
farming and soon after, in the mid-1980s, reforms were also initiated in state 
owned enterprises including more emphasis and more incentives for workers to 
improve efficiency and state-owned enterprise was opened for foreign capital. This 
led to a rise in inflows of foreign capital into China. The government’s 
liberalisation measures were meant to increase participation in the global economy 
through trade and investment. 
In the early 1990s, there was a considerable shift towards higher value 
manufacturing such as computers, electronic goods, telecommunications and 
machine tools. These goods took over a large share of exports. At the same time 
total spending on research and development (R&D) was steadily increased. As a 
consequence of government policy, the share of high technology in exports rose 
from 6% in 1992 to 29% in 2008 (WDI, 2010).Tariff and non-tariff trade barriers 
have been further reduced when China joined the WTO in 2001. With this the 
country committed to liberalise domestic markets including the financial sector, 
banks and insurance. Along with this it has undertaken the tasks to reform its legal 
system by making it compatible with international norms and regulations. In 
addition, reforms of state owned banks were carried out.  
The question arises how large Chinese companies (also known as ‘national 
champions’) would compete after the country joined the WTO. China’s accession 
to the WTO has resulted in further trade liberalisation. However, Chinese trade 
liberalisation was undertaken from a position of strength and not weakness. 
In China the share of capital goods export has steadily increased. It means that 
sustained development of capital goods industries. It seems to have contributed, 
including other factors, to its competitiveness in export of labour intensive 
manufacturing (Rodrik, 2006).China has witnessed the largest growth in industrial 
production in recent decades and the country has become the single largest 
production centre for several products in terms of volume. The pace and period of 
China’s ascent as a manufacturing country has been astonishing (McKay & Song, 
2010). By 2007, China exported more than US$800 billion worth of goods i.e. 
triple within five years. From 2005 to 2009, with the end of textile quotas, for 
example, Chinese garment exports to US market rose by 450% (Engardio, 2007). 
China’s manufacturing sector has expanded enormously during the last three 
decades, which has contributed positively to its overall economic development. 
Manufacturing is expected to offer better prospects for export incomes not only due 
to the fact that it allows for rapid productivity growth and expansion of production 
and employment but also to the fact that it helps to maintain price stability as 
volume of production increases, thereby avoiding the declining of terms of trade 
that have been experienced by majority of the developing countries in the recent 
past. China has become a very competitive manufacturing exporter and its exports 
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have risen more than 860% since 1990, while its share in international trade in 
manufactured goods has increased from only2% to 12% within the last three 
decades (Engardio, 2007).With each successive year, we find that China’s export 
products have become more diversified. The manufacturing sector played an 
important role in enhancing China’s share in the world economy and China was 
able to move to the “centre of the world economic affairs through manufacturing 
led development” (McKay & Song, 2010). 
The past experiences of East Asian countries show that development entails a 
shift from dependence on agriculture into reliance on the manufacturing and 
service sectors. This is known as structural transformation. This helps to maintain 
fast sustained growth in the economy, which could lead towards a significant 
structural transformation, as it is taking place in China (Chang, 2006). Sustained 
growth results in structural transformation. For instance, in China the share of the 
agricultural sector in total GDP has declined from nearly 60% for 1952-1978 to 
currently more than 10%. But still agriculture is the largest employer i.e. it employs 
40% of the total labour force (Felipe et al, 2013; Islam, et al, 2006; Hausmann, & 
Klinger, 2006). 
China’s exports of manufactured goods constitute an increasing proportion of 
high tech goods and it has become the world’s biggest exporter of high technology 
products, having overtaken the US in 2004. Most of China’s high tech exports are 
of electronics goods and their technological content reflects their large import 
content in high tech parts and components. China’s dependence of foreign 
technology is further illustrated by the fact that it ranks third in the world for net 
payments of royalties. Moreover, high tech exports are still dominated by foreign 
companies. However, Chinese firms have been raising their positions in the 
domestic markets, taking advantage of presence of foreign suppliers.  
Many developed countries including the US, Germany, Japan and South Korea 
had used their state-owned enterprises to develop their strategic industries 
(Gerschenkron, 1962; Amsden, 1989). In the very beginning the US model was not 
neoliberal as we see today. In the 1950s under Eisenhower, the top income tax rate 
was 92%. In US entrepreneurship was always backed by state intervention. The 
successful industries in the US were created by the state, and did not evolve from 
individualistic entrepreneurial culture as often suggested. All the top technology, 
which provided US firms with leadership, were at least financed in the beginning 
by the US defence industries e.g. computer development in early days was financed 
by the Pentagon, similarly semi-conductors, as well as aircraft e.g. the US air force 
heavily subsidised its military aircraft, and later on these technologies helped the 
US aircraft industry (Chang, 2002).   
According to the Economist, after independence both China and India had 
adopted ‘inwards looking’ policies (also known as ‘closed economy’ policy). 
Economic reforms in China began with the ascending to power by Deng Xiaoping 
in 1978 and thereafter the government welcomed international trade, overseas 
investment and foreign technology. Since then massive changes have taken place in 
average living standards in China which are still only one sixth of those of the USA 
at PPP exchange rates; but the gap is much smaller than a few decades ago. China 
enjoyed an average of 3.3% higher GDP growth rates per person than the USA in 
the period 2000-08. The Economist noted, “Economic catch-up is accelerating. 
Britain’s economy doubled in size in the 32 years from 1830 to 1862 as increased 
production spread from cotton to other industries. America’s GDP doubled in only 
17 years as it overtook Britain in 1870s. The economies of China and India have 
doubled within a decade” (The Economist, 2011:4-6). 
The Chinese entrance into the global market is taking place in a unique global 
situation, where a handful of giant companies have grown so as to generate an 
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unprecedented degree of concentration through mergers and acquisitions. As a 
result, a small number of giant firms are operating in strongly branded market 
segments. Chinese companies face immense competition and difficulties in 
catching-up with already powerful global companies, which dominate both global 
markets and supply chain segments. 
China is following the harsh logic of primitive capitalist accumulation. In China 
state owned sectors are already creating nearly one half of national output. The 
country is going through a brutal accumulation process described as a ‘Lewis’ 
model of industrialisation, where economic development is taking place with an 
unlimited supply of labour at subsistence wage, which demands an authoritarian 
political structure. For instance, “In Britain during the take-off into capitalist 
industrialisation after mid-18th it took around 100 years before the rural reserve 
army of labour was absorbed into the modern sector. This provided strong 
downward pressure on urban wage rates, with no significant trend improvement in 
unskilled worker’s real wages between 1750 and 1820s at the earliest. There was a 
prolonged phase of capital accumulation during which there was a widening of 
income disparities and no diminution of absolute poverty. Capitalist accumulation 
was accompanied by harsh measures of social control to maintain social order” 
(Nolan, 2005:8-9). 
China had large professional civil servants, selected by the competitive 
examination of which Confucian philosophy and ethics was the foundation. 
Artisans and merchants performed an essential function in promoting division of 
labour to benefit expanding domestic markets and international trade. However, in 
social ranking they were below civil servants and peasants. Moreover, there was no 
official representation of their sectional class interests at government levels. 
Chinese merchants never developed as independently from the state in the way the 
mercantile class did in medieval Europe (Bairoch, 1982). 
Openness to the global economy benefits various regions and sectors 
differently. Some win some lose. Winners recognise the benefits of integration 
with the international markets, while losers experience deteriorating control over 
policies and resources and they expect central government to compensate through 
active fiscal policies in their favour. Inequality has reached new levels never seen 
since 1950 and the gap between both urban and rural and coastal and interior 
regions is far greater than ever before. Without doubt, income inequality has 
increased. The Gini coefficient is officially around 0.48, while other researchers 
give a Gini coefficient of around 0.6. Those who work in urban areas enjoy not 
only higher incomes but increased power and influence and a western 
cosmopolitan life style, while the vast majority of the rural population, including 
unskilled and semi-skilled workers, alongside farmers in both rural areas and 
industrial zones are increasingly marginalised economically, socially and 
politically. During the late 1980s and 1990s Hong Kong proved to be an important 
source of large capital investment and technical transfer to China. Hong Kong 
entrepreneurs began shifting their industries across the border as Guangdong had 
lower labour and land costs. As a result, by 2000 manufacturing employment fell in 
Hong Kong to 250,000 from 900,000 in 1981.  
Steel industries, for example, played a successful strategic role during the early 
industrialisation period in Germany, Japan and Korea. All these countries in the 
past had very competitive steel industries. To achieve internationally competitive 
and efficient steel industries, these countries have followed various policy 
measures including subsidies, preferential credits and tax breaks (Amsden, 1989, 
Chang, 2006). In China, until recently, all domestic steel industries were under 
state ownership and therefore it was not difficult to encourage merger and 
consolidation.  Despite these policy measures, state intervention in China has been 
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less than successful so far mainly due to institutional incapability on the part of 
government (Sun, 2007). As Sun notes, “the persistence of industry fragmentation 
puts the domestic [Chinese] steel sector in striking contrast to the sweeping 
industrial and corporate changes in its global counterpart during the same period. 
That is to say, whereas the global steel sector has undergone a rapid consolidation 
process in which a handful of highly competitive steel have emerged over the last 
several decades, ... its Chinese counterpart has remained, and even became more 
fragmented from the late 1980s to early 2000s, so that a majority of steel firms 
chronically operate below the MES, with potential EOS unexploited” (Sun, 
2007:609-610). 
The increase in industrial concentration in US and EU markets was driven by 
encouraging measures such as mergers and acquisitions during 1994 and 2004. In 
Japan, for example, during this period, the concentration ratio of top four (CR4) in 
Japan was as high as 75%, in the Korean steel sector a monopoly company 
POSCO, alone accounted for 63.3% of the national crude steel output in 2004 (Sun, 
2007). The international comparison regarding industrial restructuring experiences 
shows that UK was able to consolidate the 14 largest private steel firms into one 
giant SOE, the British Steel Corporation in the 1960s; France did it in the 1980s 
with one SOE giant, Unisor and Korea achieved this aim with the family controlled 
‘chaebol’, POSCO. It seems that Chinese were unable to achieve the same success 
in industrial restructuring despite their rich experience of central planning and state 
control. Sun argues, “The use of strategic industrial policy implies the creation of 
economic rents by the state through various policy tools, ranging from investment 
subsidies to trade barriers, so that industrial catch-up can be achieved more quickly 
than if the case were determined by the functioning of pure market forces... the 
state must ensure that the rents it deliberately creates are concentrated on the small 
number prospective ‘winners’ it picks” (Sun, 2007:616).The industrial re-
structuring experience of China clearly shows a substantial part of state-created 
rent is being allocated to firms those with obsolete capacity should have exited the 
market. Sun concludes, “the structural fragmentation of the state governance that 
prevents the concentration of generated rents, and the poor coordination with in the 
bureaucracy that arises from the incentive mismatch between the central and local 
authorities, constitute the most important institutional obstacles to effective 
industrial restructuring” (Sun, 2007:621).   
Most recently, in China, big business consolidation is taking place especially in 
the steel and pharmaceutical sectors. The Shongang, which used to be state owned, 
has grown into the third largest steel plant, while Sanjiu has become the second 
largest pharmaceutical company in China. They have grown under peculiar 
Chinese bureaucracy. Strategic industrial policy was under the Ministry for 
Metallurgy Industry (MMI), which in 1997 was replaced by State Bureau of 
Metallurgic Industry (SBMI).  
Prior to the joining the WTO, China’s tariffs on steel imports were reduced 
from 23.8% in 1992 to 12% in 1996. However, new non-tariff barriers were 
brought in 1996 to protect steel industries from flood of imported steel; they 
included import registration and channelling of steel imports through selected 
SOEs. The government took the initiative to develop four leading steel companies 
– Baogang, Shougang, Angang, and Wugang – into world class steel companies 
and aimed to achieve 40% of their share of domestic output from these firms. 
Shougang also launched overseas expansion and by 1994, it had 26 overseas 
subsidiaries in 13 countries, including Hierro iron mines in Peru. This helped to 
guarantee the supply of raw materials through possession of huge iron ore reserves. 
Sanjiu’s expansion and rapid growth was linked to its location in Shenzhen SEZ 
areas. It was an SOE and was initially based on traditional Chinese medicine 
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production. Its new business strategy was based on entrepreneurial skills, product 
choice, quality control and marketing.  
The experience of Shougang and Sanjiu has had profound implications for the 
future development of the Chinese steel and pharmaceuticals industries and how 
the large SOEs have been reformed. The development of Shougang and Sanjiu 
shows how the Communist Party pushed its organisational skills and past 
experiences to make this market economic transition possible and provided the 
necessary incentives and initiatives to contribute towards building up a powerful 
group of market-oriented business organisations. The experience of these two 
industries challenges traditional theories of firm. The experience of these giant 
companies also suggests that government mediated mergers and acquisitions and 
excessive diversification did reduce number of employees, which may, in turn,  
have contributed to increased long term comparative advantage and the building up 
sufficient economies of scale and achieve MES internationally (Nolan & Yeung, 
2001). 
After China joined WTO, the issue was whether the country’s large businesses 
could compete with large global EU companies and US. China joining the WTO 
has had a significant effect on its large firms. It may be that Chinese firms may 
have to improve their efficiency as US automobile industries did two decades ago 
due to increased competition from Japanese automobile industries (Nolan, 2002). 
There might be different perspective as well, as Nolan (2002) suggests, “China’s 
large firms will generally be unable to compete on global level playing field with 
the world’s leading system integrations. China should, therefore, focus on 
improving the position of its indigenous firms within the global value chain of the 
world’s leading companies” (Nolan, 2002:120). 
Soon after the Second World War, the Japanese government introduced a 
number of initiatives to support the building of business conglomerates known as 
Keiretsu, who soon developed into global giant companies. As a result, by 1988, 
Japan had 20 of the world’s largest corporations in the fortune 500 list. Looking at 
the other countries’ experiences, the Chinese government aimed to adopt various 
industrial policy measures so that Chinese companies would be able to compete 
globally. “In our world today economic competition between nations is in fact 
between each nation’s large enterprises and enterprise groups...our nation’s 
position in the international economic order will be to a large extent determined by 
the position of our nation’s large enterprises and groups” (Chinese State Council, 
WU Banguo, August, 1998, cited in Nolan, 2002:121).  
The large companies in China include: Aerospace firm AVIC; Dongbei; in 
automobiles–Yiqui, Erqi and Shanghai, and in steel – Angang, Baogang and 
Shougang. China may have had great success in GDP growth, but has not still 
produced its own global brand names. By way of example, despite all the 
government encouragement and big domestic markets, AVIC did not succeed in 
competing with Boeing and Airbus and now all Chinese civilian aircraft are 
imported. Sanjiu is a very popular brand within Chinese markets but has had a lot 
of difficulties in overseas markets. R&D is seen as crucial in this sector because of 
its ability to generate advancements and expansion. For example, compared to big 
global pharmaceuticals companies such as Glaxco Welcome, Novartis and Merck, 
the Chinese firm, Sanjiu has negligible R&D spending.   
The world’s giant oil companies with the massive merger drive in the 1990s 
such as Chevron/Texaco, BP/Amoco/Arco, and Exxon/Mobil were able to control 
greater resources and oil reserves. They also have integrated oil refineries and 
petrochemicals along with highly efficient logistic systems, while Chinese oil 
companies are still highly protected. Foreign companies within the last two decades 
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have increased joint ventures and thus improved their positions in Chinese markets 
and oil production.  
The world’s largest economy, the USA, has had a long period of growth in 20th 
century through innovation and technical change, which has helped its industries to 
create comparative advantage and at the same time facilitate shifts from low to 
high value added activities. Kaldor (1967) argues that technological change 
facilitates long-term growth. He emphasises that increasing returns are crucial in 
manufacturing and in driving economic growth. However, mainstream economists 
discouraged such strategies as price-distorting interventions by the government 
(Hayek, 1982). Rather they backed ‘free trade’ and specialisation. It is said that 
capital mobility would be advantageous and would result in a capital inflow that 
would benefit developing nations. Economic convergence could be achieved and 
this will lead to an equalisation of interest rates and wages as capital flows from 
developed to developing countries (Bhagwati, 1982). Convergence leading to 
increase an in wages and incomes, equalise in countries involve in trade as 
suggested by the Heckscher-Ohlin model.  
Since the 1980s ‘free trade’ polices have been promoted by the international 
financial agencies and mainstream economists have been justified in the name of 
market, efficiency and competition, which is expected to stimulate economic 
convergence in developing countries. Despite such claims there no evidence to 
support the assertion. Even successful East Asian economies have not achieved 
growth by total adoption of free market polices (Rasiah et al, 2013; Wade, 2004; 
Stiglitz, 2000). It is widely acknowledged that US leadership in high tech, defence 
and electronics were achieved by large-scale government intervention in R&D and 
often through defence industries who championed key areas of innovations. 
In China, foreign capital was invited through various government initiatives and 
foreign investors were encouraged to invest in export sectors. The government 
realised that various policy measures needed to be taken both for domestic and 
overseas companies’ including a further increase in exports and moving from low 
value to high value industries (Naughton, 2007). 
The importance of trade has grown which is demonstrated by the rising share of 
its exports of manufactured goods. For instance the manufactured goods share in 
exports rose from only 0.8% in 1980 to 1.9% in 1990, 4.7% in 2000 and 13.5% in 
2010. By 2010, China had overtaken Japan, US and had become the world’s 
leading exporter of manufactured goods. (Rasiah et al, 2013) Export industries 
have grown rapidly in coastal areas – Anhui, Guangdong, Guangxi, Liaoning, 
Shandong and Tianjin and also other provinces such as Sichuan and Shanghai.  
Within manufacturing, China’s share in global exports of textiles accounted for 
34%, for office equipment 28.3% and for telecommunication 26.2% in 2010. 
China’s textiles share of the world exports rose from 4% in 1980 to 6.9% in 1990, 
to 10.3% in 2000 and 29% in 2010. Also its export share of capital goods and 
chemicals expanded gradually; chemical exports share rose from only 0.8% in 
1980 to 1.3% in 1990 to 2.1% in 200 and to 4.3% in 2010 and for iron and steel 
rose form 0.3%, to 1.2%, 3.1% and 7.3% respectively. The uninterrupted industrial 
growth and transformation was possible due to government policies, which aimed 
at industrial catch-up and increased savings which, in turn, were generated by high 
investment and a stable exchange rate (WTO, 2010; Naughton, 2007) 
Carrying out macroeconomic reforms and building up institutions is important 
for rapid economic growth. We find that the manufacturing sector along with 
investments and exports have played an important role in rapid growth rates. 
Market reforms were not undertaken as recommended by the IMF and World 
Bank, but was carried out in an unorthodox manner as suited to the domestic 
economy. Reforms were essentially based on changes in the price system and inter 
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alia brought about a determined price system (Das, 2012). At the same time 
increased focus was put on outward oriented growth strategy by facilitating the 
creation of special economic zones with the aim of attracting foreign investors. The 
government slowly moved the Chinese economy towards a market economy and 
took appropriate measures, particularly economic liberalisation, institutional 
transition and structural transformation (Naughton, 2007). 
 
7. Chinese Economy in Global Perspective 
Prior to our discussion of the Chinese economy from a global perspective, it 
would be interesting to quote The Economist, regarding the ups and downs in the 
Chinese economy in the recent past: “For most human history economic power has 
been determined by demography. In 1700 the world’s biggest economy and 
(leading cotton producer) was India, with a population of 165 million, followed by 
China, with 138million. Britain’s 8.6 million produced less than 3% of the world’s 
output. Even in 1820, as the industrial revolution in Britain was gathering pace, the 
two Asian giants still accounted for half of the world’s GDP. The spread of 
purpose-built manufactories like Quarry Bank Mill separated economic power and 
population, increasingly so as the West got richer… By 1870 the average income in 
Britain was six times larger than India or China” (The Economist, 2011:4-6). By 
the 1850s European supremacy over Asia had been established, in particular after 
the opium war in 1839-42, looting and burning of the Summer Palace in 1860 and 
finally the defeat of China by British and French armies. China suffered 
humiliation during the 19th century at the hands of European powers. 
Since 1978, income per person has risen around 8% annually in China, which 
means a doubling of incomes after every nine years, despite the fact that the 
country lacks complete private property rights and is run by the one party rule 
(Jacques, 2009).Since 1980 China’s GDP has doubled after every nine years and it 
is now 30 times larger than in 1980. The country has become the second largest 
economy in the world and the largest exporter. This is remarkable in many ways. 
However, despite the rapid increase China’s GDP was US$5.9 trillion in 2013, 
only 40% of the United States’ 14.4 trillion US$. Moreover, the GDP per person is 
quite revealing, China’s US$4260, only 9% of the United States’ US$47240. In 
2013, China’s GDP was US$9 trillion, which is larger than 154 countries 
economies combined. However, in income per capita terms it is still not a rich 
country i.e. at market exchange rates it is only 13% of the US and ranks below that 
of more than eighty other countries (The Economist, 2014). 
China has witnessed long-term average GDP growth rates of around 10% for 
the last three decades in real terms.  It has not experienced any major setback or 
interruption to its growth from the global financial crisis. One of the most 
distinguished contemporary economic historians, Angus Maddison predicts that by 
2030 China will overtake the USA as the largest economy in the world (Maddison, 
2006).Following on the beginning of the 2009 financial crisis, China has performed 
better than any of the advanced economies – in the last five year its economy grew 
by 78%, while the US by 8% (The Economist, 2014). 
However, another estimate shows even more optimism. According to IMF 
Report (2011) China is expected to overtake the US as the largest economy by 
2016. The prediction was made on the basis of PPP purchasing power. However, it 
is known that the PPP measurement is not a good deflator for inter-country price 
comparisons. Figure 5 shows the change in the IMF’s own estimates and forecasts 
of the level of Chinese GDP and US. Previously the IMF’s projections were that 
China would surpass the US as the world’s largest economy in 2019. Its revised 
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estimates are that this will now occur at the end of this year. From 2015 onwards, 
when anyone refers to the world’s largest economy this will be China, not the US. 
 
 
Figure 5: IMF Estimates & Projections of US & China GDP, PPP $ trillions 
Source: International Comparison Programme, IMF, 2013; Economist.com/graphicdetail 
 
Although China has emerged as world’s second largest economy, it is still 
classified as developing country. The rapid growth of its economy has critically 
affected the developed economies in various ways. With a population of 1.3 billion 
it has often been seen as one of the most significant emerging markets, and has 
been increasingly integrated into world markets. China’s internal resources are 
limited and therefore China has signed various socio-economic cooperation 
agreements with African countries, especially in mineral and oil areas. At the same 
time, its higher population level means that per capita GDP is still much below 
countries like Britain or the US, although this gap too is narrowing rapidly. The 
World Bank (2014) suggests that the Chinese GDP is now higher than that of the 
US. Bank estimation is based on PPP measures of national income, which is 
supposed to adjust for differences in costs between countries. However, China’s 
population is 1.3 billion, while at that of US is only 316 million. On the basis of 
PPP measure, China’s GDP per capita is only US$9,800 while the US is 
US$52,000 in 2013 (Wade, 2014). 
Chinese per capita incomes are still way below those of the US. China’s GDP is 
still around one-fifth of the size of the US as it has a population four times larger 
than the US population. But the divergence in these trends is also marked. The 
population of the US has been growing more rapidly than China, while the US 
economy has been growing much more slowly. The Chinese economy has been 
growing by over 5% more than the US over a prolonged period and Chinese per 
capita GDP has been growing by over 5.5% more than the US. This growth gap 
increased during the slump but was resumed again in 2013, when Chinese GDP 
grew by 7.4% and the US grew by 2.3%. This led to two effects. The first is that in 
the same 40 year period Chinese per capita GDP has gone from being 
approximately 5 per cent of the US level to over 20 per cent by 2008. The second 
effect is that the growth in population is only a small fraction of the overall 
contribution to Chinese growth, while it is a very large contribution to US growth. 
This is shown in the Table 3.The effect of compounding means anything that grows 
annually by 5% will double in size every 15 years. In relative terms, if the current 
growth gap were maintained the Chinese economy would be double the size of the 
US economy by not later than 2030. Living standards will catch up later, only 
because the starting-point is lower. 
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Table 3:  US, China, GDP, per capita GDP and population growth 1990-2008 (average 
annual compound rate, %) 
 GDP Growth  Population Growth Per Capita GDP Growth 
US 2.73 1.09 1.64 
China 7.97 0.86 7.11 
Source: Maddison, 2006. 
 
There has been phenomenal growth in the rise of public listed corporations in 
China; see Table 4. In 2010, public listed corporations accounted for 43% of the 
country’s GDP, compared to just 14% of the GDP in 2001 (Bryson et al, 2012). 
The question is whether China’s production is moving up in value chain and thus 
challenging the developed countries. In the ICT sector, China is among the major 
exporters of ICT products, but these are dominated by foreign owned companies. 
In 2005, about 70 % of ICT firms in China were foreign owned companies or 
subsidiaries.  
 
Table 4: Chinese Firms in Financial Times Top 100 firms  
Ranking Company Market Value 
(US$ millions) 
Sector 
2 Petro China 326,199 Oil & gas producers 
4 Industrial &Commercial 
Banks of China 
251,078 Banks 
7 China Construction Bank 232,608 Banks 
29 Bank of China 145,977 Banks 
46 CNOOC 112,560 Oil & gas producers 
49 Sinopec 107,906 Oil & gas producers 
58 China Life Insurance 94,680 Lie Insurance 
63 China Shenua Energy  89,270 Mining 
Source: Financial Times, FT Global 500 (2011) 25th June, London  
 
Between 2007 and 2012 the developed countries’ economies grew by 3%, the 
emerging and developing economies by 31% and China by 56%. We should 
emphasise that during the recent economic crisis the Chinese economy emerged as 
the second largest economy in the world as well as the leading manufacturer and 
exporter in the world (Wolf, 2014a:12). 
The scale of the changes in global trade that have taken place since the 
beginning of the international financial crisis is shown in Figure 6. This illustrates 
the increases in the total trade of China, the United States, the EU and Japan 
between 2007, the last year before the crisis, and the end of 2013.China's total 
merchandise trade in 2013 was US$1,986 billion larger than in 2007 - China's 
exports having increased by US$992 billion and imports by US$994 billion. In 
comparison, the increase in US goods trade was US$741 billion, the EU US$1,024 
billion, and Japan US$214 billion. Therefore, not only was the expansion of 
China's trade almost twice that of any other major economic centre, but it was 
larger than the US$1,979 billion for the United States, the EU and Japan put 
together (Wade, 2014; World Bank, 2014). As Rodrik (2009) observes, “The-high 
growth countries are those that are able to undertake rapid structural transformation 
from low productivity “traditional” to high productivity “modern” activities. These 
modern activities are largely tradable products, and within tradable, they are mostly 
industrial one (although tradable services are clearly becoming important as well). 
In other words, poor countries become rich by producing what rich countries 
produce”. (Rodrik, 2009:3) He further notes, “…activist policies aimed at 
enhancing the profitability of modern industrial activities and accelerating the 
movement of resources towards modern industrial activities. They go considerably 
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beyond conventional recommendation to reduce red tape, corruption, and the cost 
of doing business. They entail in addition (or sometimes instead): explicit industrial 
policies in support of new economic activities (trade protection, subsidies, tax, and 
credit incentives, special government attention)” (Rodrik, 2009:4). 
 
 
Figure 6: Change in Total Trade 2007 – 2013 (US$ billion) 
Source: Calculated from OECD (2013) Main Economic Indicator, Paris.www.oecd.org/countries/ 
 
Taking just a bilateral comparison with the United States in 2007 China's US$ 
2.2 trillion total merchandise trade was only 69 per cent of the United States. By 
2013 China's merchandise trade, at US$4.2 trillion, was 7 per cent bigger than the 
United States' US$3.9 trillion. In six years China's trade increased by almost 
US$2.0 trillion, compared to a US increase of US$0.7 trillion - China's trade grew 
almost three times as much as the United States. The change was even more 
dramatic for imports. In 2013 China's goods imports were US$993 billion above 
their 2007 level, whereas US imports were up by US$311 billion, the EU's by 
US$329 billion, and Japan's by US$212 billion. China's imports rose by more than 
three times as much as the United States - and by more than the United States, EU 
and Japan combined. China was therefore, by a huge margin, the most rapidly 
expanding market for other countries' exports (OECD, 2013). In 2012 China’s 
exports were 27% of GDP compared to only 14% for the US and 15% for Japan. 
Consequently China’s export sector is almost twice as large a proportion of its 
economy as is that of the United States. 
The economic history of developed capitalist countries suggests that the route to 
prosperity does not follow from a reliance on small industrial firms. Rather, it is 
essential, in order to build a prosperous and successful economy, to develop and 
rely on large manufacturing companies. China is attempting to create large 
internationally competitive manufacturing companies, who are supposed to take 
advantage of economies of scale (Rodrik, 2009). 
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Figure 7: Top Manufacturers in the last twenty years. (% Share of the total world 
manufacturing value added) 
Source: OECD (2013), Paris.www.oecd.org/countries/ 
 
The geography of global manufacturing has changed during the last twenty-five 
years. In recent years Chinese share of global manufacturing output and exports 
have increased (OECD, 2010). It is true that China and some other east Asian 
countries have increasingly participated in the production of manufacturing and 
exporting products, which just few decades ago was unthinkable. However, we 
need to look more closely at the evidence on the change of manufacturing 
geography and its implications. For example, in 1990, when globalisation was 
launched, the five top manufacturing countries’ (i.e. US, Japan, Germany, Italy and 
France) share in global manufacturing valued added accounted for 57.8% of the 
total. Of course within the group there were wide differences such as the fact that 
the US share was 22.7%, while French share was just 4.4% (OECD, 2013). China 
accounted for just 2.7% for the same year. China’s share in the total world’s 
manufacturing has risen sharply from only 2.7 in 1990 to 6.6% in 2000 to 21% in 
2011. See Figure 7. By 2000 the aggregate figure of global value added for 
manufacturing of the top 5 had risen to 61%, with US 26.5% and China 6.6%. 
China had joined the top 5, while France had dropped out. Moreover, during the 
last decade significant changes have taken place, especially China’s share has 
rising dramatically to 21% by2011. In 2000-2011 Brazil’s rose from 1.8% to 2.8%, 
Indonesia’s from 0.6% to 1.8%, India’s from 1.1 to 2.3% (OECD, 2013).  
On the question of global manufacturing exports the picture is not very 
different. The top 5 in terms of global exports of manufacturing accounted for 
42.5% of the total in 1995, with US accounting for 12.5%. China’s share then 
accounted for only 2.8% of the total. However, in 2009 China became leading 
exporter of manufacturing i.e. 12.9%, followed by Germany 10.3% and US 
10.1%.Considering developing countries, excluding China, South Korea’s export 
share witnessed a rise from 3 to 3.7%, India from 0.7 to 1.6%, Brazil 1.00 to 1.2% 
in the same period (Siddiqui, 2015; OECD, 2013).  
According to the statistics, the US exported US$152 billion worth of goods and 
services to China, and imported US$478 billion worth, with a trade deficit of $326 
billion in 2012. China imports a range of capital goods, high technology and raw 
materials from other countries. However, the domestic value added content of 
exports is much less than the aggregate export figure suggests. According to 
OECD, the foreign value-added content in Chinese exports has risen from 11.9% of 
gross export value in 1995 to 32.6% in 2010 (OECD, 2013). However, when 
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analysing foreign value added content, it becomes apparent that 60% is attributed 
to adding value to the inputs from other countries, primarily developed countries. 
Therefore, China appears to be a final processing place for a range of manufactured 
exports from across the world. For example, imports from China are not 
necessarily from Chinese firms, but most likely from US and EU companies. 
China’s exports of Apple iPhone, Dell computers, Gap shirts, Hasbro toys, Mattel 
dolls, Nike shoes etc. are in fact, due to the fact that US companies choose to locate 
production facilities in China or source from China. To produce iPhones in China, 
Foxconn had to import US billions of dollars of worth of parts from US companies; 
the rest of the components came from Germany, Korea, and Japan. China receives 
little return from the process 
It seems that the US is losing due to an increased trade deficit and mounting 
foreign debts, however, US companies are able to invest globally and increase 
profits and control global markets, which is far from being threatened by the 
decline of US hegemony. China’s trade-to-GDP was about 70% in 2000, making it 
substantially more integrated than other of the developed capitalist economies such 
as the UK (37%). China’s contribution to the growth of the world economy was 
merely 0.1% in 1978, however, by 2010 the situation had dramatically changed so 
that the country had emerged as a key driver of global growth, contributing 33% to 
it (OECD, 2013). 
By 2010, China accounted for 15% of the world’s value added in manufacturing 
industries, which was similar to Japan (OECD, 2013). It is often said that in a span 
of less than 3 decades China has witnessed the same degree industrialisation and 
economic development that took nearly two centuries to take place in West 
European countries. The economic size of the developed countries is changing and 
their combined GDP accounted for 50% of the world’s total GDP in 2001, 
compared to 60% in 1973. 
China’s economy was worth of over US$ 9 trillion in 2013. The economy grew 
by 7.7% in 2013, but manufacturing fell slightly. The size of workforce and 
productivity may have had the largest impact on the country’s economy. “the 
country’s urban workforce, which produces most of its output, is growing slowly. 
The age group from which this workforce springs is now shrinking outright. The 
population of working age shrank by 2.44 million in 2013, having already fallen 
several million the year before” (The Economist, 2014:63). Consumption, which 
made the biggest contribution to growth in 2011-12, was overshadowed in 2013 by 
demand and investment.  
 
8. Conclusion 
For several decades before 1980, government economic controls and regulations 
stifled entrepreneurship, private enterprise and brought economic inertia. However, 
since 1980 the influence of government has been markedly different, The Chinese 
government still plays a very active role in steering the general direction of the 
economy. The government initiated all economic reforms; market reforms, 
openness to trade and foreign capital have unleashed Chinese entrepreneurial 
energies since the early 1980s. These reforms took place at a time when the global 
economy was going through huge changes, which proved to be beneficial to China. 
Moreover, seeing these new opportunities investors from Hong Kong and Taiwan 
poured their surplus capital and technologies into the SEZs areas. The availability 
of cheap labour attracted foreign investors, which coincided with the ascendancy of 
neo-liberalism and trade liberalisation in the developed countries. It provided new 
opportunities for China. China also had high saving rates. 
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However, prior to launching of pro-market reform, China had already invested 
in critical areas such as education and health care for the majority of its people. A 
number of radical institutional reforms were carried out, which led to the higher 
rates of female participation in the labour markets. The government undertook a 
policy of egalitarian land distribution and mobilised the female population to 
participate in education and job markets. The Chinese government carried out a 
comprehensive radical land reform, altering rural asset distribution in the country. 
It eliminated the centuries-old domination of landlordism and brought greater 
equality of access to land in the countryside. Along with this, investment in key 
areas like rural electrification did facilitate the growth of rural industries. Over the 
past decades China has restructured its economy, raising productivities in 
agriculture and manufacturing sectors and also it has consolidated and enhanced its 
position as a major exporter of the manufactured goods.  
During the pre-reform period, more than 80% China’s population lived in the 
rural areas; one of the highest proportion in the world. Agriculture was organised 
on the basis of collectivisation, where people’s communes played crucial role. 
Despite various initial positive changes and an increase in agricultural output, but 
in the late 1960s rural sector witnessed stagnation. The rural reforms of 1978 led to 
institutional change in agriculture through de-collectivisation and small-scale 
enterprises. It allowed farmers to produce whatever it was profitable to produce. As 
a result, output, productivity and farmers’ income rose. Most of this increase in 
income went into house construction and consumer goods, which ultimately 
expanded domestic demand. Rural industries grew rapidly. Unlike the economic 
reforms adopted by Russia in early 1990s, China launched a slow process and the 
outcome was much better i.e. the economy grew rapidly and the growth was 
uninterrupted. Within the last thirty years the urban population has increased from 
20% to 50% of the total population. Agricultural production has increased and was 
able to meet rising domestic food demand. Besides increasing food output, and 
productivity in agriculture sector, rural income levels were increased as well. 
Despite the fact that Chinese agriculture feeds 22% of the world’s population, it 
only uses 6 % of the world’s arable land.  
The study finds that China, rather than initially building western oriented pro-
business laws such as property rights, reinforcing contract laws and freeing up 
trade, decided to focus local level support. It first began with the agricultural 
sector, where until 1978 farm prices and output were fixed by central planning; 
here government control over prices was removed. Such measures led to the 
abandoning of communes and family farming was allowed despite the fact that 
land ownership remained instate hands. Previously farmers were supposed to 
deliver fixed amounts of their produce to the government, but now after fulfilling 
the state quota, they were free to sell their surplus at market prices. Farmers saw a 
new opportunity to make profit and as a result investment, productivity and output 
rose sharply.  
China has achieved a remarkable economic transformation from a poor and 
isolated country in economic terms in the world into the second largest economy in 
just thirty-five years, with growth rates of an average of 9.6% per annum. The 
country launched market oriented reforms in 1978 by lessening government control 
and opening up markets for private investors. China has not only doubled its GDP 
and income after every seven years and lifted nearly 500 million people out of 
poverty; its economy has developed by privatising state owned enterprises. 
However, the Chinese economy could still be characterised as developing due to 
the fact that a large number of its population (i.e. nearly 50%) rely on the 
agricultural sector for their livelihood. Even though the agricultural sector’s 
contribution has declined, it still accounted for 40% of rural employment in 2012.  
 TER, 2(2), K. Siddiqui, p.49-87. 
82 
 
Turkish Economic Review 
To argue that China’s success is mainly due to foreign investment is rather 
simplistic and it is not the MNEs that have built China’s institutions and 
infrastructure. The government has played a crucial role in maintaining social 
stability and has also addressed market failures, regarding income distribution and 
has encouraged investment in key areas of the economy such as infrastructure. 
China’s export success is based on number of factors including expansion of the 
manufacturing sector. Chinese saving rates have been higher compared to EU and 
US, which allows them to invest in the economy at higher rates. Moreover, some 
have emphasised that the ‘Chinese miracle’ is largely due to the labour input of the 
“floating population” – around 250 million who work away from their native areas 
and as migrant labour, most of them in Special Economic Zones, until recently in 
dire working conditions with little political rights (Bardhan, 2010). Migrant 
workers have benefited from the country’s economic boom, but at the same time 
their incomes have been squeezed by rising food and consumer goods prices and 
lack of access to public education and health care. 
China’s oversees investment, compared to US, UK and Germany is still low, 
but it is increasing rapidly. The amount of capital exports from Chinese companies 
had reached $50 billion in 2008, with an annual increase of 60% between 2001 and 
2008. China’s spending on R&D has been steadily rising since the1990s and the 
country has surpassed Japan and became second largest R&D spending country 
after the USA. It has a labour cost advantage, which seems likely to stay at least in 
near future. China is still far behind US and EU in terms of income levels and it 
will be some years before it would be able to do it feasible to consider China 
matching their living standards. This is the reason China may have at least a 15 - 
20 year time period where it will retain cost advantages. 
One significant contribution to strong growth performance is that the Chinese 
economy has emerged as a locomotive of global growth. The growth rate of global 
GDP has averaged around 3.5% for the last three decades, while the average 
growth for next decade is likely to be higher at4% annually because of the 
contribution made by emerging economies, especially China and India. Although 
GDP growth rates decelerated in 2008-09 due to the global financial crisis, China 
still managed to avoid recession and again its rising growth rate has helped to pull 
a number of economies in the world out of the slump. China still witnessed a9.2% 
growth in 2009 (Vincelette et al,2011). The Chinese boom has entered its fourth 
decade. In just 30 years China rose from a marginal and insignificant economy to 
the second largest economy in the world, is itself no less than a miracle (Das, 
2012). China seems to be returning to the past when it was centre of the global 
economy and it contributed one-fourth to world output between 1300 and 1820 
(Maddison, 2006). In the late 19th century, when Germany emerged as a large and 
industrial economy, it caused anxieties in the then economic powers such as Britain 
and France. They perceived Germany as a disrupter of the established order, it was 
treated as antagonistic and its economic development was seen to have disturbed 
the economic and political status quo. There is fear that China might be seen as 
disrupter of the 21st
 century established economic order, which may lead to 
international hostility and tension. 
The paper finds that the corporate debt has risen in recent years in China. A 
large part of these loans has been financed with investment in trust products issued 
by the banks. The second largest loan receiver was local governments where the 
money was borrowed from sources like the China Development Bank to finance 
infrastructures and other developmental projects in the provinces. A large amount 
of credits has been channelled into the real estate sector, and seems to be heading 
towards the housing and estate sectors and most of it could be speculative. 
Recently lower demands meant that a large number of these properties are 
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unoccupied. This means property prices will increase at lower rates than expected. 
Investments are financed by credit; which clearly needs to be repaid. This could 
pose a bigger challenge for Chinese economy, if debt becomes unsustainable (e.g. 
based on ‘housing bubbles’- as was the case in many advanced countries). 
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